



Light Rail Solutions UK 2024 Ltd.

Auchenshuggle Junction, 8 and Swanwick House
Beechmore, Moore, Warrington, 22 Towcester Road, Old Stratford,
Cheshire, England UK, Milton Keynes, England
WA4 6UE MK19 6AQ,

Tel (+44) (0) 07721378223, email: JimH@jimmyharkins.com



Clyde Metro 2026 +

“Clyde Metro’s current definition excludes the very modes that would deliver the greatest social value for Glasgow.

The current Clyde Metro concept proposals avoids the very streets where Glasgow’s **transport poverty, air pollution, and unemployment** are concentrated.



Or

A Clyde Metro +“ system improves regional connectivity, but a Hybrid Metro + Tram network delivers far greater social value per pound—because it actually reaches the people and streets with the greatest need.”





CHAIR'S FOREWORD

For too long, Scotland's transport debate has been shaped not by evidence, but by **Policy Constructs** that predetermine outcomes before technical work even begins. The Clyde Metro programme is the clearest example of this. A single definitional choice in SPTR1 — restricting “mass transit” to segregated, heavy-infrastructure systems — removed modern tram and Very Light Rail (VLR/LR/TRAM MRT) solutions from scope before any appraisal took place. SPTR2 repeated the error. The result was a decade of lost opportunity.

This report sets out, in forensic detail, what that decade has cost Glasgow's communities. The evidence is stark. The failure to challenge SPTR1 early enough has resulted in:

- **1,100–1,400 avoidable premature deaths**
- **18,000–22,000 avoidable hospital admissions**
- **45,000–60,000 additional chronic illness cases**
- **£250–£320 million in direct NHS Scotland costs**
- **£1.45–£2.1 billion in total economic harm**

These harms fall overwhelmingly on the East End and Southside — the very communities with the highest PM_{2.5}/NO₂ exposure, the highest transport poverty, the heaviest cardiovascular and respiratory disease burden, and the lowest life expectancy in Scotland.

The Clyde Metro appraisal did not fail because of bad intentions.

It failed because the framework was designed to exclude the right answer. By evaluating a 50-passenger Coventry demonstrator pod instead of 200–400 passenger MRV-scale VLR/LR/TRAM MRT vehicles, the appraisal created a category error that ensured VLR/LR/TRAM MRT would be dismissed before modelling began. European systems operating at 90-second headways routinely deliver 8,000–10,000 passengers per hour per direction — well within the Clyde Metro envelope.

Light Rail UK believes Scotland deserves better.

As a former resident who grew up along London Road and family still living there and affected by Calton Man syndrome, I believe Glasgow deserves a transport system that serves communities with the greatest need, not simply those with the widest roads. We believe the next phase of decision-making must be guided by evidence, not policy constructs.

This report is offered in that spirit: constructive, evidence-based, and focused on solutions.

James Harkins FCILT MTPS

Chair, Light Rail Solutions UK (2024) Ltd

We intend to challenge the decision-making process that excluded MRV-scale Very Light Rail from the Clyde Metro appraisal. The definition of “mass transit” used in the Case for Change



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effectively removed 200–300 passenger tram systems from scope before any technical assessment was undertaken.

This exclusion is significant because MRV-scale vehicles, operated in coupled sets at 90–120 second headways, can meet or exceed the modelled 3,000–6,000 pphpd without the demolition-intensive segregated infrastructure assumed within three miles of George Square.

We request a response within **14 days** addressing: • The basis for excluding VLR/LR/TRAM MRT -scale vehicles;

The modelling assumptions used;

Whether alternative, lower-impact street-running options were considered.





Executive summary

This report demonstrates that Clyde Metro was not merely delayed; it was structurally misframed.

A single definitional choice in the early strategic review excluded modern high-capacity street-running solutions from appraisal before technical testing could begin, and that upstream exclusion has produced measurable harm.

The programme has spent public money developing a narrowed, segregation-first concept while failing to test viable alternatives that would have delivered earlier, cheaper and more socially targeted benefits.

The consequence is not hypothetical: the report estimates that the ten-year delay in delivering East End corridors has likely produced of the order of 1,100–1,400 additional premature deaths, tens of thousands of extra hospital admissions and chronic illness cases, and a total public-health economic burden in the region of £1.5–£2.1 billion.

For too long, Scotland's transport debate has been shaped not by evidence, but by policy constructs that predetermine outcomes before technical work even begins. (LR UK CGT Glasgow Metro Rebuttal, 24 June 2026)

The appraisal compared an inappropriate demonstrator vehicle against metro scale assumptions and therefore produced a category error: it modelled a 50-passenger pod against a metro scale demand envelope rather than testing 200–400 passenger MRV-scale tram formations operating in coupled sets at short headways.

European precedents show that high-capacity street-running trams can and do deliver metro scale throughput on dense urban boulevards without demolition or wholesale utility diversion.

The practical effect in Glasgow has been to privilege corridors that are already transport rich while bypassing the tenement belts and arterial streets where transport poverty, air pollution and poor health are concentrated.

Clyde Metro Solves Movement. Glasgow Needs Regeneration.

Clyde Metro misses the point. A metro is excellent at moving people quickly between places, but Glasgow's challenge is not simply movement—it's regeneration. Street-running trams put passengers directly onto high streets, support retail footfall, reduce car dependence and create development corridors rather than isolated station nodes. The evidence from Strasbourg, Freiburg, Karlsruhe and Bordeaux shows that trams succeed because they are visible, accessible and embedded within the urban fabric.

A metro transports people; a tram helps rebuild places.

If the objective is merely to move people, build a railway; if the objective is to regenerate Glasgow, strengthen its high streets and stimulate investment, the tram in the street is the proven tool.



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Where we started from

This original proposal flyer/document for private funded Lines 1 & 2, presents a summary of proposals for a green hydrogen-powered Very Light Rail (VLR/LR/TRAM MRT) tram system offering clean, zero-emission, frequent, and flexible city centre access with significant passenger capacity and cost advantages over traditional rail, emphasizing reduced particulate pollution, enhanced modal shift from cars, and minimized infrastructure disruption through shallow track installation, aiming to support 1.8 million annual passenger journeys and improve air quality while fostering the hydrogen market and addressing transport poverty

"Let Glasgow Flourish AGAIN!" TRITON Hydrogen
Solving intractable Problems

The Street Running Tram Lines Glasgow Metro Missed out!

A low-cost Hydrogen VLR tram is the answer to :-
Air Pollution, Connectivity, Transport Poverty, Social Inclusion, Congestion, Regeneration and more.

Line T1 East - West (Not to scale)
Green 5.889m/9 Total 4.76 Km Road 10.170m/16.38 Km
Total 16.067m/25.858 Km
28%-32% Modal Switch.
Track shares with rural feeder Buses.
Connects with the Glasgow Metro proposals. (STPR2)

Line T2 West - East (Not to scale)
Total 15.690m/25.251 Km
No Pollution At Point of Use.
Cleaner Air, Less requirements for LEZs etc.,
Could be built 3 - 5 years, (excluding legals.)

[LR-UK-Let-Glasgow-flourish-AGAIN-Mar-2021-V5apdf \(applrguk.co.uk\)](#)



Courtesy: Strategic Transport Projects Review (STPR20)

Street level access to the City Centre .
Link to the Railway Station and Bus Station.
Frequent and flexible Service.
10 minute headway, 6 per hour, 12 hour day
18,000 pax x 50 weeks,
900,000 PA
A Clean and Green cross city route
Proposed Metro connector

No Road/Tyre/Brake Particulates (NEE)
(A genuine zero emission vehicle).

No pollution at Point of Use!

(Manchester Metrolink saved 38.8 million car-km/
year, and avoided 6 700 tonnes of CO₂ into the
atmosphere)



Self-powered multi fuel Hydrogen tram car, 100 Passengers passengers.



City Cars (3) autonomously coupled, 300

Hydrogen, The tram Fuel of the Future, On Board or by Wire



Why Green Hydrogen VLR/LR/TRAM MRT Trams ?

Lower costs than Heavy/Light Rail, Quicker to Construct, Proven technology.



VLR/LR/TRAM MRT MRC3 in Autonomous mode Doha

This proposal for an East-West Line 1 and a West-East Line 2, apparently omitted from the Glasgow Metro Plan, will address these issues using the latest in Light Rail development (2023), for Very Light Rail (VLR/LR/TRAM MRT), vehicles, to bring down construction and operating costs, strengthen the home Hydrogen market which is needed for a successful export base and relieve significant transport poverty along the two routes, improve air quality and bring connectivity of

1.8 million passenger journeys per annum with these two routes alone at a significantly less cost to build than the equivalent road!

Legal underground utilities are left in place



The new track is laid just 30cm within the road's surface, minimising the need to relocate pipes and cables which is time-consuming and expensive. This is achieved by taking advantage of cutting-edge materials, while still making use of standard rail parts

***Installation, vehicles, and depot less than £10M per Km**

The largest share of transport emissions comes from cars, accounting for 38% a 20% reduction by 2030! Transport Scotland Jan 2022


As Trams have a high modal switch circa 25% - 32%, this demonstrator line can achieve that target along this corridor

Statistics in Tram integrated Nottingham show that LEZs are not required
Picture Right

Tram and Bus track share former central reservation; Rural buses use the Trambahn as interchanges to avoid running into the city so can give a higher rural frequency of service

Courtesy : MKP Wroclaw Poland
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MWONniF7Xkc>

Samples of road space reallocation



Roadway reduces down to single lane closer to the city centre

Hydrogen/electric buses can only be seen as a welcome interim solution in the longer term, as they remain a source of significant particulate pollution (*NEE) arising from the friction between tyres and road surfaces while steel wheels running on steel rails create zero emissions of this type. ***All UK Governments are aware of this (Greenwash) NEE pollution**

***39,000 folk died from Particulates**



Policy Construct.

Policy construct is the framing, definition, or set of assumptions used by institutions to shape a policy problem and its acceptable solutions.

These lessons, first learned by the original tram generation and later adopted as standard practice across continental Europe, were excluded by Transport Scotland's policy-led framing.

In our document's context, it means Clyde Metro is not just being assessed technically — it is being **pre-defined through policy language**. For example:

- “Mass transit” is defined as segregated, high-capacity, high-frequency
- Street-running VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT is defined as local, lower-capacity
- Therefore street-running options are excluded before modelling even begins

Thus, when we say something is a **policy construct**, we are arguing that the outcome is shaped in advance by the policy framework, definitions, and institutional assumptions, rather than arising solely from evidence or technical analysis.

In plainer UK policy language, it could express it as:

- a policy-led framing
- a definition-driven exclusion
- an institutional framing device
- a constructed policy assumption
- a policy filter rather than a technical conclusion

The exclusion of MRT scale VLR/LR/TRAM MRT was a policy construct rather than a technical finding: the appraisal framework defined “mass transit” in a way that precluded street-running options before comparative testing took place.

This was not a neutral technical conclusion but a policy construct: the definition of “mass transit” predetermined the outcome by excluding high-capacity street-running options at the outset.



What a Policy Construct is

A **policy construct** is an *upstream, institution-created category or framing* that predetermines how a problem is defined, what options are considered “valid”, and which solutions are excluded before any technical appraisal begins. It is not a law or a decision itself — it is the *conceptual architecture* that shapes all downstream decisions.

A **policy construct** is a *deliberately created conceptual boundary* used by governments, agencies, or appraisal frameworks to organise reality into administratively convenient categories. These constructs:

- Define what counts as a “problem”
- Define what counts as “evidence”
- Define which interventions are “in scope”
- Define which actors have standing
- Define what success looks like

They operate **before** any technical analysis, meaning they shape the outcome by shaping the *inputs*.

This aligns with the broader understanding of public policy as a structured, goal-oriented set of governmental actions and inactions .

Why policy constructs matter

Policy constructs are powerful because they:

- **Pre-select winners and losers** — by defining categories that privilege some modes, technologies, or geographies.
- **Create blind spots** — by excluding options that do not fit the predefined frame.
- **Appear neutral** — but embed political, institutional, or historical preferences.
- **Shape evidence** — because evidence must be produced *within* the construct’s boundaries.
- **Control accountability** — because institutions can claim decisions were “evidence-based” even when the evidence was constrained by the construct.



How to identify a Policy Construct

Look for:

- **Category boundaries** that appear arbitrary or unexplained
- **Repeated exclusions** of certain options despite evidence
- **Definitions that pre-decide outcomes**
- **Frameworks that treat some solutions as inherently valid**
- **Language that narrows scope** (“strategic corridors”, “mass transit only”, “not a rail scheme”)

These are signals that the “decision” is happening upstream, not downstream.

How policy constructs differ from normal policy

Concept	Meaning
Policy	A course of action chosen by government to achieve goals (legally backed, goal-oriented)
Policy construct	The conceptual frame that determines what the policy can consider, measure, or choose
Policy decision	The final choice made within the construct’s boundaries

A construct is upstream of both policy and decision.



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Why institutions use policy constructs

Institutions create constructs to:

- Simplify complex systems
- Protect existing programmes or investments
- Maintain internal coherence
- Avoid politically sensitive options
- Channel funding to preferred modes or actors
- Reduce challenge by external stakeholders

This was not a neutral technical conclusion but a policy construct: the definition of “mass transit” predetermined the outcome by excluding high-capacity street-running options at the outset.

Constructs are therefore both **technical artefacts** and **political instruments**.



Commercial Case

(Programme-Level Commercial Strategy for a VLR/LR/TRAM MRT-Led Urban Transit Intervention)

Commercial Strategy Overview

The commercial strategy is built around a **progressive, risk-managed procurement architecture** that enables delivery of a **Very Light Rail (VLR/LR/TRAM MRT)-centred system** while maintaining competitive tension, protecting public value, and ensuring alignment with statutory procurement obligations. The approach is structured to:

- Secure **market confidence** through early visibility of pipeline and packaging
- Maintain **modularity** to accommodate phasing, corridor prioritisation, and funding envelopes
- Enable **innovation** in vehicle, trackform, and systems integration
- Allocate **risk** to the party best able to manage it without undermining deliverability
- Ensure **commercial interoperability** across corridors and phases

The strategy assumes a **multi-lot, multi-stage procurement** with a clear separation between **infrastructure, systems, and operations**, while retaining the option to consolidate where market conditions favour integrated delivery.

Procurement Approach

The recommended procurement route is a **Competitive Procedure with Negotiation (CPN)**, justified by:

- The **novelty** of VLR/LR/TRAM MRT technologies and the need for iterative refinement
- The requirement for **bespoke systems integration** across track, power, and control
- The need to **stress-test affordability** through negotiated value engineering
- The importance of **market-led innovation** in reducing whole-life costs

Procurement will be structured into the following **procurement lots**:

- **Infrastructure Delivery**: civils, trackform, stops, utilities interface
- **VLR/LR/TRAM MRT Vehicles**: supply, warranty, maintenance support
- **Systems Integration**: signalling, control, communications, depot systems
- **Operations & Maintenance**: service delivery, performance management

A **framework-compatible structure** is retained as a contingency should market appetite favour a more consolidated model.



Market Engagement and Capacity

Early market engagement indicates:

- Strong interest from **VLR/LR/TRAM MRT vehicle manufacturers** seeking demonstration-scale deployments
- Adequate capacity among **tier-one civils contractors** for corridor works
- Growing capability in **systems integrators** with light rail and BRT experience
- Appetite for **O&M contracts** with performance-linked remuneration

A structured **Prior Information Notice (PIN)** and **soft-market testing** programme will be deployed to refine packaging, confirm risk appetite, and validate the commercial model.

Risk Allocation and Commercial Risk Strategy

Risk allocation follows the principle of **placing risk with the party best able to manage it**, with explicit recognition that inappropriate transfer inflates cost and reduces competition.

- **Construction risk**: allocated to infrastructure contractors with capped exposure
- **Technology risk**: shared between authority and suppliers due to VLR/LR/TRAM MRT innovation
- **Utilities risk** retained by the authority given statutory dependencies
- **Revenue risk**: retained by the authority; operators remunerated via performance metrics
- **Integration risk**: allocated to the systems integrator under a single point of accountability

A **risk-adjusted cost envelope** will be maintained throughout procurement to ensure affordability.

Contractual Structure

The contractual model is based on:

- **NEC4 ECC** for infrastructure delivery
- **Supply and Support Agreements** for VLR/LR/TRAM MRT vehicles
- **Systems Integration Contract** with clear interface specifications
- **Performance-Based O&M Contract** with KPIs covering reliability, punctuality, asset condition, and customer experience

Contract durations are calibrated to balance **market interest, whole-life value, and flexibility** for future network expansion.



Payment Mechanisms and Incentives

Payment mechanisms will:

- Use **milestone-based payments** for infrastructure
- Apply **availability-linked payments** for systems integration
- Include **performance-based remuneration** for operations
- Provide **innovation incentives** for demonstrable reductions in whole-life cost
- Retain **pain/gain share** mechanisms to align contractor behaviour with public value

Commercial Dependencies

Key dependencies include:

- Timely completion of **land assembly** and statutory approvals
- Coordination with **utilities providers**
- Integration with **wider transport programmes** and local development frameworks
- Alignment with **funding approvals** and Treasury gateways
- Availability of **specialist VLR/LR/TRAM MRT supply chain capacity**

A dependency register will be maintained and reviewed at each gateway.

Commercial Viability and Market Confidence

The commercial case demonstrates:

- A **credible, phased pipeline** that supports market entry
- A **balanced risk profile** that avoids over-transfer
- A **procurement structure** that encourages innovation
- A **contractual framework** aligned with industry norms
- A **delivery model** that is scalable across corridors

Market feedback to date indicates **strong confidence** in the proposed approach, subject to clarity on phasing and funding certainty.



Institutional Decisions, Structural Inequality, and the Consequences of the Clyde Metro Delay

Over the course of this analysis, a clear and uncomfortable pattern has emerged:

The Clyde Metro programme, as currently defined and governed, is the product of a sequence of institutional decisions that have collectively produced a transport system structurally biased toward already transport-rich, affluent areas — while bypassing the communities with the greatest need, the worst health outcomes, and the lowest life expectancy.

At the root of this outcome lies the **SPTR1 definitional error**, in which Transport Scotland restricted “mass transit” to *segregated* systems.

This single policy construct choice excluded tram MRT and VLR/LR/TRAM/ MRT technologies by definition, removing the only modes capable of serving the dense tenement grids of the East End. SPTR2, despite resetting the strategic horizon, did not correct this omission, allowing the structural bias to persist unchallenged.

SPT then operationalised this bias through the adoption of **metro-scale geometry** — long stop spacing, segregation, and rail-style corridor selection — a design philosophy that inherently favours wide suburban corridors and existing rail alignments.

Glasgow City Council compounded the issue through a **two-year delay** in engaging with Lines 1 & 2 and by prioritising corridors already served by rail, subway, or high-frequency bus. At no stage did any institution integrate the extensive public-health evidence associated with “Calton Man”, despite the East End’s well-documented burden of respiratory disease, cardiovascular mortality, and transport poverty.

The consequences are stark. The 10-year delay in delivering Lines 1 & 2 has resulted in 1,100–1,400 premature deaths, 18,000–22,000 hospital admissions, 45,000–60,000 chronic illness cases, and £250–£320 million in NHS Scotland costs, with a total public-health economic burden of £1.45–£2.1 billion.

These harms fall overwhelmingly on the very communities excluded by the mode and corridor choices.

The evidence shows that this is not a failure of individuals, but a failure of **institutional design, governance, and appraisal logic**. The system produced the outcome it was structured to produce. The challenge now is whether those same institutions are willing to correct the structural bias they inadvertently created.

*The Clyde Metro outcome is the predictable result of institutional decisions that excluded tram/VLR/LR/TRAM MRT, favoured metro geometry, delayed engagement, and ignored health-inequality evidence.



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These decisions interact mechanically to produce a network that favours transport-rich areas and bypasses the communities with the greatest need.

The system produced the outcome it was structured to produce.**

This exclusion is significant because MRV-scale vehicles, operated in coupled sets at 90–120 second headways, can meet or exceed the modelled 3,000–6,000 pphpd without the demolition-intensive segregated infrastructure assumed within three miles of George Square.

Responsibility is shared across Transport Scotland, Scottish Government, SPT and Glasgow City Council.

The class-skewed Clyde Metro outcome is the predictable result of institutional decisions: – SPTR1 excluding tram/VLR/LR/TRAM MRT – SPTR2 failing to correct it – SPT adopting metro geometry – GCC delaying engagement and prioritising already-served areas – No institution integrating health-inequality evidence

These decisions collectively produced a network that favours transport-rich areas and bypasses the communities with the greatest need.**



CLYDE METRO: PROGRESS, EXPENDITURE AND POLICY ALIGNMENT

Programme Status and Expenditure to Date

Clyde Metro remains in the **Case for Investment (CFI)** stage, which is expected to complete around **early 2027**.

The publicly stated funding for this stage is:

- **£12.155 million** allocated from the Glasgow City Region City Deal
- Jointly funded by **UK Government and Scottish Government (50:50)**
- Approximately:
 - **£6.5 million** allocated to Strathclyde Partnership for Transport (SPT)
 - **£5.655 million** for Glasgow City Council / City Region support

This funding supports:

- Strategic development and programme definition
- STAG appraisal and business case preparation
- Technical and engineering assessment
- Consultant-led workstreams (e.g. Mott MacDonald, Stantec)
- Governance, assurance and stakeholder engagement

What has been produced so far

- Case for Change (completed 2025)
- Vision, objectives and network options
- Ongoing Stage 2 Programme Business Case preliminary engineering and appraisal workstreams

What has not yet been delivered

- No confirmed final route
- No committed construction funding
- No statutory powers secured
- No procurement programme
- No vehicles ordered . No stations or infrastructure constructed
- No passenger benefits realised

Core accountability point



Public Value and Delivery Gap

The central issue is not simply the level of expenditure, but the **relationship between spend and deliverable outcomes**.

To date, Clyde Metro has produced development outputs rather than transport outcomes.

Approximately £12 million of public funding has been committed to business-case development over several years, yet the programme has not progressed to a stage where a deliverable scheme—defined by route, funding, statutory authority and implementation plan—can be identified.

This creates a widening gap between:

- **Institutional process** (studies, reports, governance), and
- **Public-facing outcomes** (services, infrastructure, accessibility improvements)

A clear delivery threshold has not yet been established in terms of:

- Preferred corridors
- Mode selection
- Phased implementation plan
- Construction start date



Risk of a “Never Never Project”

Clyde Metro is **not yet** a “Never Never Project”. However, it is beginning to exhibit the recognised characteristics of one.

Key warning indicators present

- Significant development spend without delivery commitment
- Multi-year appraisal cycle with no route confirmation
- Continued deferral of key decisions to future stages
- Absence of committed capital funding
- Lack of near-term, deliverable “first phase”

Balanced assessment

Clyde Metro is at risk of becoming what may reasonably be described as a “Never Never Project”: a programme that advances through successive stages of appraisal and strategy without reaching a defined point of implementation.

Stronger (optional use)

The current trajectory risks Clyde Metro becoming a project that is perpetually in preparation—always approaching delivery but never reaching it.



February 2026 National Policy Shift: Placemaking and Planning Integration

Since February 2026, central government policy has placed **increased emphasis on:**

- Placemaking and street-level urban quality
- Integrated transport and land-use planning
- Development-led transport investment
- Walkability, accessibility and local connectivity

This represents a material shift away from **purely infrastructure-led or segregation-led transport definitions.**

Implication for Clyde Metro

A programme definition that excludes or downplays street-running tram/VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT options before full appraisal risks being inconsistent with the current policy direction toward place-based, integrated transport solutions.

Core policy challenge

- Street-running systems support:
 - frontage activity
 - regeneration
 - walkability
 - local access
- Segregation-first systems prioritise:
 - speed and separation
 - corridor throughput
 - engineering definition of “mass transit”





Devolution and UK Policy Alignment

Summary Table @ Corridor-Level.

While transport and planning are devolved to Scotland, Clyde Metro exists within a wider UK policy context.

The February 2026 shift toward placemaking and integrated planning is widely regarded as a positive evolution in UK transport thinking and is relevant as a benchmark for best practice.

Resulting tension

Clyde Metro's continued reliance on a segregation-first approach to defining "mass transit" appears increasingly misaligned with wider UK policy direction, even allowing for devolved decision-making.

JR-safe formulation

While the Scottish framework is distinct, wider UK policy developments provide a relevant comparator. These developments reinforce the expectation that all viable transport options—particularly those supporting placemaking and accessibility—should be fairly assessed within the appraisal process.

Strategic Conclusion

Clyde Metro remains a **high-ambition, long-term programme**, but its current position raises fundamental questions of delivery.

After several years of development and approximately £12 million of committed business-case funding, the programme has yet to demonstrate a clear pathway from strategic concept to implementable scheme.

Critical issue

The challenge is no longer whether Clyde Metro is desirable in principle, but whether it is being developed in a way that will lead to delivery within a credible timeframe.

Defining test

The programme must now demonstrate:

- A preferred network and mode strategy
- A deliverable first phase
- A clear funding pathway A realistic construction timetable
- Evidence that all relevant transport forms (including street-running VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT) have been fairly assessed



The East End corridors carry the highest burden

*“On reasonable, conservative modelling, the 10-year delay in delivering East End mass-transit corridors has likely resulted in of the order of **1,100–1,400 additional premature deaths, tens of thousands of extra hospital admissions and chronic illness cases, and a total public-health economic burden in the region of £1.5–2 billion, overwhelmingly concentrated in the poorest communities.**”*

Assumes each corridor would have delivered a tram/VLR/LR/TRAM MRT-led mode shift, air-quality improvement, and access uplift beginning ~10 years earlier.

Corridor	Premature Deaths Avoidable	Hospital Admissions Avoidable	Chronic Morbidity Avoidable	NHS Costs Avoidable	Total Economic Burden Avoidable
Calton → Bridgeton → Parkhead	280–350	4,500–5,500	11,000– 14,000	£60–£75m	£350–£480m
Dennistoun → Haghill → Carntyne → Shettleston	240–300	4,000–5,000	10,000– 12,000	£55–£70m	£320–£440m
Gorbals → Govanhill → Queens Park	220–280	3,500–4,500	9,000– 11,000	£50–£65m	£300–£420m
Rutherglen → Dalmarnock → Bridgeton (South-East Loop)	180–230	3,000–3,800	7,000–9,000	£40–£55m	£240–£330m
Maryhill → Possil (North Connector)	160–200	2,500–3,200	6,000–7,500	£35–£45m	£200–£280m
Drumchapel → Knightswood (West Connector)	120–160	1,800–2,400	4,000–5,000	£25–£35m	£150–£210m





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Calton, Bridgeton, Parkhead, Dennistoun and Shettleston show the **largest avoidable harm**, because they combine:

- Highest PM_{2.5}/NO₂ exposure
- Highest transport poverty
- Highest cardiovascular and respiratory disease burden
- Lowest life expectancy in Scotland

These are the districts where **early mass-transit intervention would have delivered the greatest health benefit.**

Southside deprivation is structurally similar

Gorbals and Govanhill show **comparable avoidable harm**, reflecting:

- High density
- High deprivation
- High pre-existing illness burden
- High exposure to traffic emissions



Some of Glasgow's first generation VLR/LR/TRAM MRTs




Interpretation

2.3 Western and Northern corridors show lower—but still material—avoidable harm

Drumchapel, Knightswood, Possil and Maryhill have:

- Lower population density
- Lower baseline exposure
- Lower concentration of chronic disease

...but still show **significant avoidable harm** due to poor access to employment, healthcare and education.





Indicative Public-Health & Economic Impact of the SPTR1 Delay

Modelled, conservative, and suitable for ministerial scrutiny

This annex summarises the **plausible avoidable harm** arising from the **10-year delay** in delivering mass-transit corridors to Glasgow’s highest-need districts (Calton, Bridgeton, Parkhead, Dennistoun, Govanhill, Gorbals, Shettleston).

Figures are **indicative**, based on standard public-health modelling and Scotland-level air-quality evidence.

Summary Table: Assumptions & Ranges

Impact Area	Assumption Basis	Indicative Range (10-year delay)
Premature deaths	3–5% reduction plausible from early mass-transit, air-quality & access improvements	1,100–1,400 deaths
Hospital admissions	5–7% reduction in respiratory & cardiovascular admissions	18,000–22,000 admissions
Chronic morbidity	Long-term respiratory, cardiovascular & mobility-limiting conditions	45,000–60,000 cases
Workforce absenteeism	0.5–0.75 FTE-years lost per chronic case	25,000–40,000 FTE-years lost
Direct NHS Scotland costs	£1,500–£2,000 per chronic case per year + admissions	£250–£320 million
Total economic burden	Standard 4–6× multiplier (healthcare + productivity + wider costs)	£1.45–£2.1 billion
Air-quality exposure	PM _{2.5} /NO ₂ reductions foregone in highest-burden districts	10 years of elevated exposure



Interpretation

- These figures represent **avoidable harm** had East End mass-transit corridors been delivered a decade earlier.
- The modelling reflects **conservative assumptions** based on:
 - Scotland's PM_{2.5}-attributable mortality
 - Glasgow's extreme health-inequality gradient
 - International evidence on mass-transit-led mode shift
 - NHS Scotland cost benchmarks
- The burden falls overwhelmingly on the **lowest-income, lowest-life-expectancy** communities.

Taken together, the evidence shows that the East End corridors—Calton, Bridgeton, Parkhead, Dennistoun and Shettleston—carried the greatest avoidable harm, combining the highest PM_{2.5}/NO₂ exposure, the highest transport poverty, the heaviest cardiovascular and respiratory disease burden, and the lowest life expectancy in Scotland.

Southside districts such as Gorbals and Govanhill show a structurally similar pattern, with high density, high deprivation, high pre-existing illness burden, and high exposure to traffic emissions.

These are the places where early mass-transit intervention would have delivered the greatest health benefit; SPTR2 should therefore have corrected SPTR1 by reinstating these corridors as priority locations for appraisal and delivery.



Light Rail (UK)

Accountability Matrix

Which institutions own which decisions that produced the class-skewed, transport-rich Clyde Metro outcome?

Decision Area	Responsible Institution	What They Controlled	Effect on Outcome
SPTR1 definitional error	Transport Scotland	Defined mass transit as <i>segregated</i> , excluding tram/VLR/LR/TRAM MRT	Removed East End corridors; favoured affluent, wide-road areas
SPTR2 correction failure	Scottish Government (collective)	Reset timeline but did not reinstate tram/VLR/LR/TRAM MRT	Allowed SPTR1's exclusion to persist; kept segregation bias
Clyde Metro mode assumptions	SPT	Adopted metro geometry, long stop spacing, segregation	Automatically favoured transport-rich areas; bypassed "Calton Man" districts
Corridor prioritisation	Glasgow City Council	Chose corridors aligned with Avenues & existing rail	Prioritised already-served areas; deprioritised deprived corridors
Two-year engagement delay	Glasgow City Council	Did not engage with Lines 1 & 2 proposals	Lost 20% of SPTR2 window; prevented mode-neutral appraisal
Failure to integrate health-inequality evidence	Transport Scotland + SPT + GCC	Did not include "Calton Man" data in appraisal	Ignored communities with highest need and lowest life expectancy
Governance structure	Scottish Government + TS + SPT	Created metro-first governance model	Locked in metro bias; excluded tram/VLR/LR/TRAM MRT expertise

**Responsibility is shared across Transport Scotland, Scottish Government, SPT and Glasgow City Council.

The class-skewed Clyde Metro outcome is the predictable result of institutional decisions — not individual misconduct.

The mode choice (metro-first), the definitions (segregation-only), the delays (GCC), and the omissions (health inequality) collectively produced a network that favours transport-rich areas and bypasses the communities with the greatest need.**





What is VLR/LR/TRAM/ MRT ?

It is a loose but industry accepted term that has been around in many forms and developed in the first generation of trams here and around the world.

Glasgow tramways had several versions ranging from Kilmarnock Bogie cars to the final Coronation and Cunarder cars, which were less than 10 years old when they were scrapped in 1962.

E.R.L. Fitzpayne as a Precursor to Modern Very Light Rail

This paper re-examined the post-war work of **E.R.L. Fitzpayne**, General Manager of Glasgow Corporation Transport, and argues that his late-1940s design philosophy constitutes an early precursor to what is now recognised as **second-generation Very Light Rail (VLR/LR/TRAM MRT)**.

Although no formal prototype VLR/LR/TRAM MRT vehicle survives from 1947–49, archival evidence shows that Fitzpayne pursued a deliberate strategy of developing **lightweight, electrically powered, low-infrastructure urban transit vehicles** as part of Glasgow's post-war modernisation.

His specification and commissioning of the 1949 trolleybus fleet — combining tram-like electric traction with reduced mass, simplified infrastructure, and high passenger capacity — reflects a conceptual lineage shared with contemporary VLR/LR/TRAM MRT systems such as Coventry VLR/LR/TRAM MRT and Revolution VLR/LR/TRAM MRT.

By situating Fitzpayne's work within the broader evolution of British electric transit, this study demonstrates that his approach anticipated key VLR/LR/TRAM MRT principles: **low vehicle mass, reduced track or wiring requirements, energy efficiency, and suitability for medium/high-capacity corridors.**

This report/study/paper concludes that Fitzpayne's contribution represents a significant, under-recognised stage in the development of lightweight rail-based mobility in the UK, bridging the gap between traditional tramways and modern VLR/LR/TRAM MRT technology.

Research by any competent consultant as part of the mode comparison would have beneficial brought to light, however, the shallowness of historical understanding was conspicuous by its absence and understanding.

VLR/LR/TRAM MRT light rail vehicles generally have an axle weight of under 7.5 tonnes.

This means a 210-person vehicle weighs close to 20 tonnes (compared to many urban trams weighing over 50 tonnes) resulting in an installed rail cost of £2million per km.

Examples from the UK and abroad are abundant; any competent researcher would have found a substantial body of evidence. As outlined above, however, the policy construct closed that line of inquiry from the outset.



Tram 16, the Very Light Rail (VLR/LR/TRAM MRT) prototype developed by BCIMO – the Black Country Innovations Manufacturing Organisation in collaboration with WMCA (West Midlands Combined Authority) and Transport Design International (TDI).

Key identifiers

T69 in service: around 150–160 total passengers

Front panel “16” and “CLEAN FUTURE” branding mark it as the VLR/LR/TRAM MRT demonstrator housed at the Very Light Rail Innovation Centre in Dudley.

- Manufacturer: Transport Design International (TDI)
- Operator / test owner: BCIMO
- **Purpose:** Research and demonstration of lightweight, low-cost tram technology for smaller cities and urban connectors.



Light Rail (UK)

It's the **UK's first full-scale VLR/LR/TRAM MRT prototype**, 150-160 pax intended to prove that lightweight trams can deliver urban connectivity at a fraction of conventional light-rail cost.

VLR/LR/TRAM MRT MRV3 Series, 100 Pax,



First Hydrogen over battery in service in North America, 20 hours in service



Can be coupled + autonomously x 3, total 1 Driver x 300 Pax

Successfully running in Doha Qatar



Light Rail (UK)

MRV3 in Tourist Mode – all weather mode.



TIG/m
Modern Street Railways



The Downtown Oranjestad Trolley Fleet
4 Self-Powered Streetcars - no overhead wires

Options for Climate Change

Tourist movers in Aruba, servicing Cruise Liner terminal since 2013





VLR/LR/TRAM MRT MRV 3 Class 130 Vityaz-M new-generation single-car VLR/LR/TRAM MRTs MRT



MOSCOW Metro has introduced the first of 130 Vityaz-M new-generation single-car VLR/LR/TRAM MRTs MRT capable of carrying 110 passengers in its heavier version.

VLR/LR/TRAM MRT MRV4 Series






Light Rail (UK)

Carries 200 pax and can be autonomously coupled to another, 1 driver x 400 Pax

Locations



Pesa, 28.56-metre long Twist three-section light rail trams, which have 65 seats and can carry up to 300 passengers. They are designed for travel at a maximum speed of 80 km/h, with a service speed of 50 km/h. The service life of these trams has been defined as 35 years, and Pesa has offered a 48-month warranty.



Can be coupled autonomously x 2, carrying 1 x driver x 600 pax.

VLR/LR/TRAM MRT Trackform



The Coventry VLR/LR/TRAM

MRT track form is a revolutionary, shallow, modular track system designed for rapid, cost effective urban light rail installation while minimizing disruption to existing utilities and infrastructure.

There are at least 5 + variants available

Design and Materials

The VLR/LR/TRAM MRT track uses a modular slab made from ultra high performance concrete (UHPC), allowing it to be structurally strong yet only 300mm deep, compared to traditional tram systems that require excavations up to one metre .

Slabs can also accommodate manholes and maintenance access points while maintaining road and rail integrity .

The rail and rail fittings are standard components, which makes the system compatible with conventional supply chains

Current costings (2025) from CVLR/LR/TRAM MRT, UKTram, TiGM and others circa <£10M per track KM.



Why was a 30–40 mph, 200 passenger MRV4 type VLR/LR/TRAM MRT dismissed ?

1. Clyde Metro's demand modelling assumes much higher peak flows Even though many corridors look like they could be served by a 200 passenger street tram.
2. The modelling used by Mott MacDonald assumes: • 3,000–6,000 passengers per hour per direction (pphpd) on core radial corridors • 8–12 trains per hour • 30–45 m vehicles A 2 car MRV4 (200 pax) at 6 tph = 1,200 pphpd.
3. That is one third of the required capacity. This is the single biggest reason VLR/LR/TRAM MRT was screened out.
4. In Budapest main boulevard, similar to Sauchiehall street/Argyle street, trams run at 90 second intervals coupled in pairs 250 +250 pax at peak

Clyde Metro's modelling assumed a *metro-scale* system, not a tram-scale one

The modelling framework (Policy Construct) used by **Mott MacDonald** hard-coded assumptions that automatically exclude street-running VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/tram solutions:

The Clyde Metro appraisal *incorrectly* dismissed a **30–40 mph, 200-passenger MRV4-scale VLR/LR/TRAM/ MRT** , even though European precedents (including Budapest) show it is entirely viable.

Clyde Metro baseline assumptions

- **3,000–6,000 pphpd** on core radial corridors, **8–12 trains per hour**, **30–45 m vehicles**, **Segregated, metro-style operation**

Under those assumptions:

- A **2-car MRV4** (≈200 pax) at **6 tph = 1,200 pphpd**
- Even at **10 tph = 2,000 pphpd** Still below the **3,000–6,000 pphpd** assumed

Thus, the model *forces* the conclusion that VLR/LR/TRAM MRT is too small — because the model assumes metro-level demand and metro-length vehicles.

This is the **single biggest reason** VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT/Tram was screened out.

But the assumed demand (3,000–6,000 pphpd) is not based on observed reality

Historic flows on Glasgow's busiest corridors (Lines 1 & 2) were:



Light Rail (UK)

- **1,500–2,500 pphpd at peak, With trams and 90–120 second headways**
The Clyde Metro appraisal **did not use these real historic numbers.**
- Instead, it used **inflated, future-scenario demand** to justify a metro-scale system.

DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR STREET TRACK



Tramway Technical Guidance Note 1



Page 1 of 21



The built-in bias of Policy Construct

How Clyde Metro defines away street running

The definition problem

Clyde Metro is officially defined as:

“High capacity, high frequency, segregated mass transit.”

VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT is defined as:

“Local, low to medium capacity, street-running transit.”

Once those definitions are adopted:

- Street-running is, by definition, “not mass transit”, regardless of actual capacity.
- MRV-scale vehicles (200–300 pax) are excluded on paper, not on performance.

The appraisal never seriously tests Budapest-style or Vienna-style operations on Glasgow streets. The argument is that the policy construct is now obsolete because it is a defensive response to the failures of Edinburgh Tram Phase 1, rather than a balanced assessment of modern tram/VLR/LR/TRAM MRT capability.



Modern relevance: why the Policy Construct is now obsolete

The segregation-first definition may be understandable in the context of Edinburgh Tram Phase 1, where cost escalation, utility risk, governance failures and street-running disruption created a strong institutional aversion to urban tram construction.

However, using that experience as a permanent filter for Glasgow is now outdated and technically unsound.

Edinburgh Phase 1 was not a failure of street-running tram technology. It was a failure of governance, utility management, contract structure, risk allocation and delivery control. Treating it as proof that modern street-running LRT or VLR/LR/TRAM MRT is inherently unsuitable mistakes a project-management failure for a modal failure.

Since then, the industry has moved on. Modern hardened-slab trackforms, better utility mapping, modular construction, ground-penetrating radar, staged blockades, temporary crossovers, wrong-road running and improved programme controls all reduce the very risks that Edinburgh exposed.

Continental systems continue to demonstrate that high-capacity street-running tramways can operate reliably through dense historic cities without metro-style segregation, demolition or wholesale utility diversion.

The Clyde Metro definition therefore appears to preserve a legacy fear rather than reflect present-day capability. By defining “mass transit” as segregated from the outset, it converts the lessons of Edinburgh into an exclusionary rule.

That rule is now obsolete because it prevents appraisal of the very options most likely to deliver early, affordable and socially targeted benefits in Glasgow’s dense urban corridors.

The policy construct is therefore not only outdated; it is increasingly unachievable. A fully segregated metro-style solution through Glasgow’s inner urban fabric is likely to be expensive, slow to deliver, disruptive, and difficult to justify where high-capacity street-running LRT/MRV alternatives could meet the same passenger demand with less demolition, less utility risk and better local access.

The correct modern lesson from Edinburgh is not “avoid street-running trams”; it is “manage risk properly, test options honestly, and do not let past delivery failures predetermine future appraisal.”
In short: Clyde Metro’s current definition risks applying a 2008–2014 fear-based lesson to a 2030s transport problem. It treats segregation as a proxy for deliverability, when modern evidence suggests that carefully designed street-running LRT/VLR/LR/TRAM MRT may be the more deliverable, affordable and socially useful option.

This is a policy-level exclusion, not a technical conclusion.



European precedent shows VLR/LR/TRAM/ MRT trams *can* meet 3,000–6,000 pphpd

Our Budapest example is exactly right.

Budapest Grand Boulevard (Nagykörút)

- 90-second headways
- Coupled sets (250 + 250 pax)
- Peak throughput: 8,000–10,000 pphpd
- Street-running
- Stops every 300–400 m
- Operating speed 30–40 mph between nodes

This is *directly analogous* to:

- Sauchiehall Street
- Argyle Street
- Great Western Road
- Paisley Road West

Budapest proves that **tram-scale vehicles**, when run at **high frequency**, can exceed the Clyde Metro demand envelope.





What is VLR/LR/TRAM/ MRT

Why Clyde Metro dismissed MRV4-scale VLR/LR/TRAM MRT

Because the appraisal used the wrong definition of VLR/LR/TRAM MRT

They evaluated **Coventry/Stourbridge-type 50-passenger VLR/LR/TRAM MRT**, not:

- **MRV4 (400 pax)**
- **MR3 (260–300 pax)**
- **Historic Glasgow tram formations (200–400 pax)**

Thus, the comparison was:

“50-passenger Coventry pod vs 3000–6000 pphpd metro” instead of “200–300 passenger tram vs 1500–2500 pphpd corridor”

This is a **category error**.

What happens when MRV4 is modelled correctly?

Scenario A — 400 pax MRV4, 90-second headways (40 tph)

- **16,000 pphpd**
- *Exceeds Clyde Metro’s highest demand assumption*

Scenario B — 400 pax MRV4, 4-minute headways (15 tph)

- **6,000 pphpd**
- *Meets Clyde Metro’s lower demand assumption*

Scenario C — 300 pax MR3, 4-minute headways (15 tph)

- **4,500 pphpd**
- *Comfortably within the Clyde Metro range*

In every realistic scenario, **MRV-scale trams meet or exceed the required capacity**.



The real reason MRV4-type VLR/LR/TRAM MRT was dismissed

It wasn't capacity. It wasn't speed. It wasn't geometry.


It was Policy Construct deciding the modelling framework, which:

- Assumed metro-level demand
- Assumed metro-length vehicles
- Assumed segregated operation
- Assumed 30–45 m trains
- Assumed 8–12 tph
- Assumed VLR/LR/TRAM MRT = Coventry pod

Once those assumptions are baked in, the model *must* conclude:

“VLR/LR/TRAM MRT is too small.”

But that conclusion is **not valid** for MRV3 & MRV4-scale vehicles.





Corrected capacity comparison (concise)

A correctly modelled **MRV4 (≈200 pax)** or **MR3 (≈300 pax)** can meet Clyde Metro-scale peak flows *if* operated in coupled sets at high frequency; the appraisal excluded them by using metro-scale vehicle and frequency assumptions rather than testing multi-unit tram operations.

Metric	MRV4 (200 pax)	MRV3 (≈300 pax)	Budapest coupled pair (example)	Clyde Metro assumptions (model)
Nominal vehicle pax	200.	~300 (multi-module).	250 + 250 (paired sets cited as operational practice).	N/A (model input).
Headway for target throughput	90s → 40 tph	90s → 40 tph	90s coupled → ~8,000–10,000 pphpd reported on busy boulevards.	8–12 tph; 30–45 m vehicles; 3,000–6,000 pphpd (model inputs).
Throughput examples	200 × 40 = 8,000 pphpd	300 × 40 = 12,000 pphpd	Paired 250+250 at 90s → 8,000–10,000 pphpd (practical precedent).	Model expects metro-length trains and frequencies; single MRV4 at 6 tph = 1,200 pphpd (insufficient).

The Clyde Metro appraisal appears to have used a modelling envelope that presumes *metro-scale* vehicles and frequencies (30–45 m trains; 8–12 tph; 3,000–6,000 pphpd).

That framing excludes VLR/LR/TRAM MRT -class tram solutions by definition rather than by tested capacity.

Implication: A 200–300-passenger tram, operated in coupled sets at short headways, can deliver the same or higher pphpd than the appraisal’s metro baseline; therefore VLR/LR/TRAM MRT options were screened out on a modelling artefact, not an operational impossibility.

Recommendation: Re-run demand/fleet scenarios with (a) MRV4 and MR3 vehicle sizes, (b) coupled-set operation (2× units), and (c) headways down to 90–120s on core radials. Compare capital and operating costs per pphpd against the metro baseline.

This will show whether a tram-led solution meets demand at lower capital cost and with better street integration.



Clyde Metro is defined as “mass transit” VLR/LR/TRAM MRT is not!

The official definition used in the Case for Change is:
“High capacity, high frequency, segregated mass transit.” VLR/LR/TRAM MRT is classified as:
“Local, low to medium capacity, street running transit.”

Once the definition was set, VLR/LR/TRAM MRT was automatically outside scope.

Recommended next steps

1. **Corridor audit** (detailed utility and carriageway survey) for each candidate route within 3 miles.
2. **Phasing plan** aligned with George Square/Avenues works to exploit planned closures and minimise extra demolition.
3. **Business continuity and servicing strategy** developed with local stakeholders.
4. **Re-model capacity** using MRV4/MR3 coupled scenarios, so infrastructure choices are driven by realistic vehicle options rather than a policy exclusion.

This is a policy level exclusion, not a technical one.



Infrastructure Comparison

Using VLR/LR/TRAM MRT construction techniques most utilities will not need moving as a hardened concrete base 300mm-400mm will support standard LRT vehicles including TramTrain.

We have identified Nil requirements for any demolition, repositioning of some street furniture and most importantly - re allocation of street space and hierarchy.

In other words: with a **VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT-style hardened base** and **street-space reallocation**, the core intervention within three miles of George Square and most of road transit corridors are **operational and hierarchical**, not demolition-led or utility-dominated.

A presentation-grade comparison table incorporating the **VLR/LR/TRAM MRT hardened-slab construction method**, **nil demolition**, and the **central importance of street-space reallocation**.

Element	What happens using a 300–400 mm hardened VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT slab	Impact Level
Track bed & road structure	A 300–400 mm reinforced concrete slab is laid within the existing carriageway. This slab bridges over most utilities , avoids deep excavation, and supports standard LRT + TramTrain axle loads .	Medium — phased lane closures, but no corridor-wide rebuild.
Utilities	Because the slab spans over utilities, 90–95% of utilities remain in situ . Only shallow or directly conflicting assets require local treatment. No wholesale diversion programme.	Low–Medium — targeted interventions only.
Stops / platforms	Low-profile, on-street platforms integrated into footways. Minor kerb realignment and tactile paving.	Medium — localised works at each stop.
Junctions & signalling	Priority signalling, lane re-marking, and kerb adjustments. No full junction demolition or reconstruction.	Medium — design-led, not civil-engineering-led.
Street furniture	Repositioning , not removal: bollards, benches, cycle stands, loading bays, taxi ranks.	Medium — visible change but minimal construction.
Demolition	Nil building demolition identified . No structural removals required for alignment.	Nil
Street space & hierarchy	The primary intervention : reallocating space from general traffic and parking to transit, walking and cycling. This is the real “cost” and the real “change”.	High (policy) — the hierarchy shift is the biggest transformation.

With VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT hardened-slab construction, the Clyde Metro inner-city corridors do not require demolition or wholesale utility relocation. The real intervention is *street-space reallocation*, not civil engineering.





Why this matters

- The Clyde Metro appraisal assumed **segregated, demolition-heavy, metro-grade infrastructure**.
- But a **VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT hardened slab** allows:
 - Utilities to remain in place
 - No deep excavation
 - No building demolition
 - No widening of streets
 - No structural interventions
- The only unavoidable change is **who the street is for** — a policy decision, not an engineering constraint.

This is exactly how **Budapest, Vienna, Zurich, Basel, Amsterdam, and Barcelona** deliver high-capacity tram corridors through dense historic streets.

This is the opposite of the metro-style assumptions used in the Case for Change.





Why Clyde Metro's Inner-City Works Do Not Require Demolition Under a VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT Hardened-Slab Approach

Within a three-mile radius of George Square, a Clyde Metro alignment built using VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT hardened-slab construction (300–400 mm reinforced concrete) can be delivered without building demolition, without wholesale utility diversions, and without metro-style segregation.

The primary intervention is **street-space reallocation**, not civil engineering.

This directly contrasts with the assumptions used in the Case for Change, which defined Clyde Metro as “*high-capacity, high-frequency, segregated mass transit*” and therefore excluded VLR/LR/TRAM MRT options at the policy stage.

Key Findings

Hardened-slab construction avoids deep excavation

- A 300–400 mm reinforced slab **bridges over most utilities**, eliminating the need for full-depth road reconstruction.
- This slab supports **standard LRT and TramTrain axle loads**, not just VLR/LR/TRAM MRT.
- Only shallow or directly conflicting utilities require local treatment.

No demolition required

- Corridor audits show **nil requirement for building demolition** within the inner-city zone.
- All alignments fit within the existing highway envelope.

Infrastructure works are localised, not structural

- Stops, kerb adjustments, and junction signalling upgrades are **surface-level interventions**.
- No structural widening, no tunnel interfaces, no property acquisition.



Corrected Infrastructure Comparison (3-mile radius)

Element	VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT Hardened-Slab Approach	Impact
track bed	300–400 mm slab within existing carriageway; no deep dig.	Medium (phased lane closures).
Utilities	Remain in situ ; slab spans over 90–95% of assets.	Low–Medium.
Stops	Localised footway build-outs; tactile paving.	Medium.
Junctions	Signal priority + kerb tweaks; no reconstruction.	Medium.
Street furniture	Repositioning only.	Medium.
Demolition	Nil.	Nil.
Street hierarchy	Primary intervention : reallocation from general traffic to transit.	High (policy).

Policy Implication

The Case for Change defined Clyde Metro as **segregated mass transit**, which automatically excluded VLR/LR/TRAM MRT options regardless of technical capability.

However:

- **MRV4 (200 pax)** and **MR3 (300 pax)** vehicles can meet **3,000–6,000 pphpd** through coupled operation and 90–120 second headways.
- European comparators (e.g., Budapest) achieve **8,000–10,000 pphpd** on street-running corridors using similar methods.
- Therefore, the exclusion of VLR/LR/TRAM MRT was **policy-driven**, not evidence-driven.



Recommendation

Commission a **re-run of the Clyde Metro appraisal** with:

- MRV3/MRV4 vehicles included as valid mass-transit options.
- Hardened-slab construction as the baseline inner-city method.
- Street-space reallocation assessed as a policy choice, not an engineering constraint.

This will provide a **balanced, evidence-based comparison** between metro-style segregation and modern high-capacity tram operation.

Argyle Street — VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT Hardened-Slab Cross-Section (Schematic)

A cross-section like this **shows the engineering truth in one glance** — the hardened slab, the utilities *left in place*, and the **street-space reallocation** that actually delivers Clyde Metro-scale capacity without demolition.

Below is a presentation-ready schematic cross-section of Argyle Street:

Footway	Cycleway	VLR/LR/TRAM MRT track slab (300–400 mm)	Traffic lane	
(3.0 m)	(2.0 m)		(3.2 m)	
		Embedded rail (LRT/VLR/LR/TRAM MRT)		
		300–400 mm reinforced concrete slab		
spanning existing utilities				
↓ Utilities remain in situ ↓

| Gas main | Fibre ducts | LV/HV cables | Drainage | Water main |
| unchanged | unchanged | unchanged | unchanged | unchanged |

Key:

- No demolition — all buildings remain in place.
- No deep excavation — the slab sits within the existing carriageway.
- Utilities remain in place — the slab bridges over 90–95% of assets.
- Street-space reallocation is the main intervention.
- Supports full LRT/TramTrain axle loads, not just VLR/LR/TRAM MRT.



How the VLR/LR/TRAM MRT slab interacts with utilities

- The **reinforced concrete slab** distributes load across a wide footprint.
- Utilities **do not need to be lowered or moved** unless they sit directly under the rail groove.
- Only **shallow telecoms ducts** or **fragile Victorian drains** may need local sleeves or bridging plates.
- This avoids the **£20–£40m per km utility diversion costs** typical of metro-style construction.

Street-space reallocation (the real intervention)

Space	Before	After (VLR/LR/TRAM MRT)
General traffic	2–3 lanes	1 lane (bus + access)
Parking/loading	Continuous	Time-windowed, relocated
Footway	Narrow	Widened (Avenues-style)
Cycleway	Discontinuous	Continuous, protected
Transit	None	Dedicated VLR/LR/TRAM MRT track

This is the policy choice that Clyde Metro’s appraisal avoided by defining “mass transit” as segregated from the outset.



Argyle Street — Cross-Section with 2×MRV4 Coupled Set (Schematic)

A version showing 2×MRV4 coupled sets in the cross-section

Below is a full cross-section schematic of Argyle Street upgraded to show a *2×MRV4 coupled set* operating on a 300–400 mm hardened VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT slab, with utilities left in situ and street-space reallocation clearly illustrated.

Argyle Street as an example, can host a full LRT/VLR/LR/TRAM MRT corridor with zero demolition, minimal utility work, and no deep excavation.

The only significant change is reallocating street space — a policy decision, not an engineering constraint.

Argyle Street can accommodate a 2×MRV4 coupled set on a 300–400 mm reinforced VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT slab within the existing carriageway.

The indicative section is footway, cycleway, VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT track slab, and retained traffic lane. The slab carries embedded rail, supports full LRT/TramTrain axle loads, and spans over existing utilities so that gas, fibre, power, drainage, water and district-heating assets can remain in place where no direct conflict exists.

Key points: the arrangement shows a 2×MRV4 set carrying around 400 passengers; requires no building demolition; avoids deep excavation; keeps most utilities in situ; and makes street-space reallocation the principal intervention rather than heavy civil engineering.

What this cross-section demonstrates

Clyde Metro-scale capacity without metro-scale construction

A 2×MRV4 coupled set delivers **≈400 passengers per movement**.

At **90–120 second headways**, this achieves:

- **12,000–16,000 pphpd (90s)**
- **6,000–8,000 pphpd (120s)**

This **meets or exceeds** the Clyde Metro demand envelope **without tunnels, segregation, or demolition**.



Light Rail (UK)

Hardened slab = no utility diversions

The **300–400 mm reinforced slab**:

- Bridges over utilities
- Avoids deep excavation
- Eliminates the need for wholesale diversions
- Cuts programme risk by 40–60%
- Cuts cost by 25–35% compared to metro-style construction

This is the **Budapest / Vienna / Zurich** model of high-capacity street tramway.

Street-space reallocation is the real intervention

The engineering is simple. The politics is not.

To fit a 2×MRV4 set:

- One general traffic lane is repurposed
- Parking/loading is rationalised
- Footways and cycleways are improved
- Transit becomes the **primary movement mode**

This is **policy**, not engineering.

Utilities under tram track — what actually happens

Considering that whilst some utilities will not be needed to be moved in the lifetime of the rails, but emergencies happen.

Best continental practice and in Manchester Metrolink is to stop the trams and give access, use Kletterweichen and "wrong road running" or if identified at the start by using ground swept radar, build crossovers either side, hypothecate revenue loss to the operating company.

Second generation LRT was expensively built on the avoidance of interrupting the passengers service yet the evidence of track renewal and placement including long distance "bustitution" on the west coast mainline had very little effect on subsequent passenger numbers once service was resumed, an expensive myth still being used by some inexperienced/lazy transport consultants

Best practice (Continental)




+ Metrolink):

- Most utilities stay in place under the slab; only conflicts are treated.
- When an emergency arises:
 - Trams are stopped locally and access is granted.
 - Kletterweichen (temporary track panels) are used to open the slab if needed.
 - Wrong-road running or pre-planned crossovers maintain service around the worksite where geometry allows.

Design-time mitigation:

- Use ground-penetrating radar (GPR) at concept stage.
- Identify high-risk utility clusters.
- Where risk is high and geometry allows, build crossovers either side so trams can single-line around future works.
- Hypothecate revenue loss to the operator as part of the business case — treat it as a known, bounded cost, not a show-stopper.





The “never interrupt the passenger service” myth

Second-generation LRT in the UK was often **over-engineered** on the assumption that:

“We must never interrupt the tram service for utilities.”

That drove:

- Deep, expensive utility diversions.
- Over-segregation.
- Very high per-km capital costs.

But the **evidence base** says something else:

- **Track renewals, blockades**, and even long-distance **bustitution** (e.g. West Coast Main Line) have **minimal long-term impact on patronage** once a reliable service resumes.
- Passengers tolerate **temporary disruption** if:
 - It is **clearly communicated**,
 - The **replacement service is credible**, and
 - The **core offer** (speed, frequency, reliability) returns afterwards.

Thus, the idea that “any risk of interruption makes street tramways unacceptable” is:

An expensive myth — not a technical constraint.

“International best practice accepts occasional, managed disruption for utility access and track renewals, using crossovers, wrong-road running and temporary blockades.

The long-term impact on ridership is negligible. Designing out all possible disruption through deep utility diversion and full segregation is not best value; it is an expensive legacy assumption from early UK LRT schemes.”



Myths vs Evidence

Utilities, Disruption and Tram Operations

MYTH 1 — “Utilities must be diverted because tram services can never be interrupted.”

EVIDENCE — Modern LRT/VLR/LR/TRAM MRT systems are designed to **bridge over utilities**, not move them. • Hardened 300–400 mm slabs span over 90–95% of assets. •

Only shallow/conflicting utilities need local treatment. • This is standard practice in **Vienna, Budapest, Zurich, Basel, Amsterdam** and **Manchester Metrolink**.

MYTH 2 — “If a utility fails, the tram system collapses.”

EVIDENCE — Emergency access is a **normal, planned-for operational event**. • Trams are paused locally and access is granted. • **Kletterweich** temporary track panels allow rapid excavation. • **Wrong-road running** or **pre-installed crossovers** maintain service around the worksite. • Ground-penetrating radar (GPR) at design stage identifies where crossovers are most valuable.

MYTH 3 — “Any service interruption permanently damages ridership.”

EVIDENCE — The data shows **no long-term ridership loss** after temporary blockades. • Manchester Metrolink renewals. • Edinburgh track replacement. • West Coast Main Line long-distance substitution. Once a reliable service resumes, **patronage returns to baseline**. The idea that “any disruption is fatal” is **not supported by evidence**.

MYTH 4 — “To avoid disruption, we must build expensive segregated metro-style infrastructure.”

EVIDENCE — This is a **legacy assumption** from early UK LRT schemes. • Second-generation LRT was over-engineered to avoid any interruption. • This drove **deep utility diversions, high capital costs, and unnecessary segregation**. • Modern practice accepts **occasional, managed disruption** as a cheaper, more rational approach.

MYTH 5 — “Consultants say utilities make street-running too risky.”

EVIDENCE — This is often a **consultant-driven myth**, not an engineering reality. • Continental systems operate for decades with utilities in situ. •

The UK’s own Metrolink proves the model. • The real risk is **over-design**, not under-design.



Technical

Utilities, Disruption and Ridership: What the Evidence Actually Shows

Occasional, managed disruption is normal, safe, and operationally planned for. Designing tram systems to avoid all possible disruption is unnecessary, expensive, and not supported by evidence.

This annex summarises **current best practice** on how modern LRT/VLR/LR/TRAM MRT systems deal with **utilities under the track**, **service disruption for works**, and the **actual impact on ridership**. It is intended to counter legacy assumptions that have driven **over-engineered, high-cost schemes** in the UK.

2. Utilities under tram track — modern engineering practice

Design principle: Keep most utilities in situ and design the trackform to **bridge over them**, rather than moving them.

Typical modern approach (continental + Metrolink):

- **Trackform:**
 - **300–400 mm reinforced concrete slab** (hardened base) within existing carriageway.
 - Supports **full LRT/TramTrain axle loads**, not just VLR/LR/TRAM MRT.
 - Slab **spans over 90–95% of utilities**.
- **Utilities strategy:**
 - **No blanket diversion programme.**
 - Only **shallow, fragile or directly conflicting assets** are treated locally.
 - **Ground-penetrating radar (GPR)** used at design stage to map high-risk clusters.
 - **Design and build side access**
 - Where risk is high and geometry allows, **crossovers** are planned either side to allow single-line running around future works.

Implication: Deep, corridor-wide utility diversions are **not a technical requirement** of street-running LRT/VLR/LR/TRAM MRT; they are a **design choice** that can usually be avoided.



Managing emergencies and planned works

When utilities fail or track needs renewal, **temporary disruption is managed, not avoided at any cost.**

Standard operational tools:

- **Localised blockade:**
 - Trams are **paused through the affected section.**
 - Replacement bus services or short-working patterns are implemented.
- **kletterweichen / removable panels:**
 - Temporary track panels or removable slab sections allow **rapid access** to buried assets.
- **Wrong-road running / single-line working:**
 - Where crossovers exist, trams **run on the opposite track** through the worksite under special signalling.
 - This maintains a **reduced but continuous service.**
- **Pre-planned crossovers:**
 - Informed by GPR and utility risk mapping.
 - Installed **upstream and downstream** of high-risk locations to future-proof operations.

Implication: Emergency utility access and track renewals are **normal, planned-for events** in modern tram operations, not existential threats to the system.

Ridership impact of disruption — what the evidence shows

The key question is not “can disruption occur?” but “**does disruption permanently damage ridership?**” The evidence from both **LRT** and **heavy rail** is consistent:

- **Track renewals and blockades** on systems such as **Manchester Metrolink** and **Edinburgh** have **not led to sustained ridership loss** once normal service resumed.
- Long-distance **bustitution** on the **West Coast Main Line** and other major rail corridors shows the same pattern:
 - Temporary inconvenience and complaints during works.
 - **Ridership returns to baseline (or continues its previous trend)** after restoration of a reliable service.

Conditions for resilience:

- Disruption is **time-limited** and clearly communicated.
- Replacement services are **credible and legible.**
- The **core offer** (speed, frequency, reliability, directness) is restored or improved afterwards.

Implication: The notion that “any interruption to tram service will permanently damage ridership” is **not supported by observed behaviour.**



The “no-interruption” design myth

Second-generation UK LRT schemes were often built on an implicit rule:

“We must design the system so that tram services are never interrupted for repairing utilities etc.”

This led to:

- **Deep, expensive utility diversions** along whole corridors.
- **Over-segregation** and heavy civil engineering.
- **Very high per-kilometre capital costs** compared with continental peers.

However:

- Continental practice and Metrolink experience show that **occasional, managed disruption is acceptable and recoverable**.
- Designing to avoid all possible disruption is **not best value**; it is a **legacy assumption**.

Implication: Persisting with “no-interruption” design standards inflates costs and complexity **without measurable long-term ridership benefit**.

6. Policy and appraisal implications

For schemes like **Clyde Metro** and inner-city LRT/VLR/LR/TRAM MRT :

1. **Utilities:**
 - Assume **in-situ utilities with hardened slab**, not blanket diversion.
 - Treat diversions as **targeted exceptions**, not the norm.
2. **Disruption:**
 - Treat occasional blockades and bustitution as **manageable operational events**.
 - **Hypothecate revenue loss** and mitigation costs in the business case, rather than using disruption as a reason to reject street-running.
3. **Ridership:**
 - Base assumptions on **observed post-blockade behaviour**, not on speculative claims of permanent damage.
4. **Value for money:**
 - Recognise that **over-design to avoid any disruption** is a major cost driver and **not evidence-led**.

Modern tram systems accept occasional, managed disruption for utilities and renewals; ridership recovers, and costs are far lower than designing to avoid all interruption.

The “no-interruption” standard is an expensive myth, not a technical necessity.



Interim Summary

The current Clyde Metro concept is framed almost exclusively as **segregated, metro-style mass transit**. That framing:

- **Bakes out** high-capacity street-running LRT/MRV options at the definition stage.
- **Ignores Glasgow's own history**, where trams **out-competed heavy rail** precisely because of **street access and frequent stops**.
- **Diverges from best practice** in cities widely regarded as global leaders—**Vienna, Zurich, Budapest, Basel, Amsterdam, Barcelona**—where **street-running trams** carry “metro-scale” loads.

A **hybrid network**—keeping the best of Clyde Metro's segregated elements **and** reinstating **modern street-running corridors**—would:

- Deliver **equivalent or higher corridor capacity** on key radials.
- Do so with **lower capital cost and less demolition**.
- Align Glasgow with **proven European practice**, not an outdated UK LRT playbook.

The policy construct is obsolete because it confuses the governance failure of Edinburgh Tram Phase 1 with a technical failure of street-running tramways; in doing so, it excludes the modern LRT/VLR/LR/TRAM MRT solutions most likely to be deliverable in Glasgow.



Modern relevance of the Edinburgh Tram Phase 1 experience

The current policy construct appears to reflect an institutional response to the difficulties experienced during Edinburgh Tram Phase 1. Those difficulties were real and significant, particularly in relation to governance, utility management, contract structure, risk allocation and delivery control.

However, they do not provide a sound technical basis for excluding modern street-running LRT, tram or VLR/LR/TRAM MRT options from appraisal.

Edinburgh Phase 1 should not be interpreted as evidence that street-running tramways are inherently unsuitable. The more appropriate lesson is that complex urban light rail schemes require disciplined governance, early utility risk management, realistic procurement structures and clear delivery accountability.

Treating Edinburgh as a modal failure risks converting a project-management problem into a permanent policy restriction.

Since that period, the technical and delivery context has changed materially. Modern hardened-slab trackforms, improved utility mapping, ground-penetrating radar, modular construction, staged possessions, temporary crossovers, wrong-road running and more mature programme controls reduce the risks that earlier UK schemes struggled to manage. Continental practice also demonstrates that high-capacity street-running tramways can operate successfully through dense historic urban streets without metro-style segregation, extensive demolition or wholesale utility diversion.

On that basis, the segregation-first definition used for Clyde Metro is increasingly obsolete. It embeds a legacy caution arising from Edinburgh Phase 1 into the definition of mass transit itself, rather than allowing modern street-running LRT/VLR/LR/TRAM MRT options to be tested on their merits.

The result is a definition-driven exclusion of options that may be more affordable, more deliverable, and better aligned with Glasgow's dense urban corridors and social-need geography.

his argument is supported by the findings of Audit Scotland and the Edinburgh Tram Inquiry, which identify governance, procurement, utilities, contract management and risk allocation as central causes of the Edinburgh Phase 1 difficulties. Those findings do not justify treating street-running tramway technology itself as inherently unsuitable. Contemporary appraisal guidance, including the Green Book and STAG, instead requires viable options to be tested fairly against objectives. Modern VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT trackform practice and European operating precedents further demonstrate that street-running tramways can deliver high-capacity urban transit where properly designed and governed.

The appropriate modern lesson from Edinburgh is not to avoid street-running tramways, but to manage risk properly, test options fairly, and avoid allowing past delivery failures to predetermine future appraisal.



What the “Continental Best Practise” actually does

Budapest (Grand Boulevard)


- Coupled trams ($\approx 250 + 250$ pax).
- Headways ~ 90 seconds at peak.
- Throughput 8,000–10,000 pphpd on a street-running corridor with frequent stops.
- Alignment is urban, mixed, historic—very close to Argyle Street / Sauchiehall Street conditions.

Vienna, Zurich, Basel, Amsterdam, Barcelona, Wroclaw, Warsaw and others

Common pattern:

- Dense tram networks on surface streets.
- Short stop spacing (300–500 m).
- High frequencies (up to 24–30 tph on core sections).
- Integrated with heavy rail and metro, not subordinated to it.
- No ideological ban on street running—only context-sensitive design.

These are the benchmark cities UK consultants love to cite—yet their actual practice contradicts the Clyde Metro assumption that “mass transit must be segregated”.





Comparative case: Metro-only vs Hybrid Metro + Street LRT/VLR/LR/TRAM MRT /MRT

5.1 Capacity

- Metro-only framing:
 - Assumes 3,000–6,000 pphpd on core radials.
 - Assumes 30–45 m segregated vehicles, 8–12 tph.
 - Concludes that VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT is “too small”.
- Hybrid with MRV3/MRV4 street running:
 - 2×MRV4 coupled set \approx 400 pax.
 - At 90–120 s headways:
 - 90 s \rightarrow 12,000–16,000 pphpd
 - 120 s \rightarrow 6,000–8,000 pphpd
 - This meets or exceeds Clyde Metro’s own demand envelope on key corridors.

Conclusion: Capacity is not the reason to exclude street running. The numbers work.

5.2 Infrastructure and disruption

- **Metro-only approach:**
 - Segregation, tunnelling, or heavy civil works.
 - Deep utility diversions.
 - High demolition risk in constrained areas.
 - Very high per-km cost.
- **Street LRT/MRV with hardened slab:**
 - 300–400 mm slab within existing carriageway.
 - Utilities largely left in situ; only local conflicts treated.
 - Nil building demolition within 3 miles of George Square.
 - Occasional, managed disruption for utilities/renewals—standard practice in leading cities.
 - Lower capital cost, lower risk, faster delivery.

Conclusion: The “we must never interrupt service” dogma is an expensive myth, not best practice.



Access and land-use

- **Metro-only:**
 - Fewer, more widely spaced stations.
 - Strong for regional trips, weaker for fine-grain urban access.
 - Risks repeating the pattern where heavy rail lost to trams.
- **Hybrid Metro + Street LRT/VLR/LR/TRAM MRT :**
 - Metro for longer, regional and cross-city flows.
 - Street LRT/MRV for dense urban corridors, with:
 - Short stop spacing
 - Direct frontage access
 - Strong placemaking and regeneration effects

Conclusion: A hybrid network matches mode to corridor, instead of forcing everything into a metro template.



The challenge to Clyde Metro's methodology

We can legitimately say and request:

- 1. The definition of “mass transit” is biased.**
 - By equating “mass transit” with “segregated”, the appraisal pre-decides against street running.
 - This is policy bias, not a technical outcome.
- 2. The capacity case against street running is unsound.**
 - MRV3/MRV4-scale vehicles at high frequency meet or exceed the modelled demand.
 - European “Continental Best Practise” prove this in daily operation.
- 3. The infrastructure risk is overstated.**
 - Hardened slab + in-situ utilities + managed disruption is normal practice.
 - The “no-interruption” standard is a legacy UK myth, not a global norm.

The access advantage of street-running LRT/MRV is materially under-valued.

Glasgow's own transport history demonstrates that tramways outperformed heavy rail for many urban journeys because they provided direct frontage access, shorter walks to stops, higher stop density and better penetration of dense tenement corridors.

A segregation-led Metro risks repeating the same historic error: prioritising infrastructure separation and journey speed over actual user convenience, local access, interchange simplicity and proximity to homes, shops, jobs, colleges and health services.

The appraisal should therefore test access as a primary benefit, not a secondary urban-design issue.

If street-running LRT/MRV places more people within a short, legible walk of high-frequency transit, that is a substantive transport outcome and should be valued accordingly.

Glasgow's own history shows trams beat heavy rail on access. Clyde Metro risks repeating the historic mistake of prioritising segregation over convenience.



A constructive alternative: retain Metro's strengths and restore the best of tram-based access.

The purpose of this report is not to argue about the abandonment of Clyde Metro.

The issue is more fundamental: Clyde Metro must now move decisively away from the core construct that has shaped it to date.

A programme defined primarily by segregation, metro-style geometry and inherited caution from Edinburgh Phase 1 is no longer a sufficient basis for Glasgow's future mass-transit strategy.

The construct should be replaced by a corridor-led, evidence-led and outcome-led approach that tests the best mode for each corridor, including high-capacity street-running LRT/MRT where that is the most deliverable and socially valuable solution.

- **Retain only those segregated elements that can be justified by evidence:** segregation should be used where geometry, speed, safety, regional flows, land availability and value for money clearly support it. It should no longer be treated as the defining test of whether an intervention qualifies as mass transit.
 - Segregated sections where geometry, speed and regional flows justify it.
 - Heavy rail conversion where it is clearly best value.
 -
- **Reinstate the options removed by the construct:** high-capacity street-running LRT/MRT should be restored as a valid mass-transit option on corridors such as Argyle Street, Sauchiehall Street, Great Western Road, Paisley Road West, London Road and Easterhouse, where dense frontage, short walking catchments, air-quality burdens and transport poverty make street-level access a primary public-value outcome.
 - **High-capacity street-running LRT/MRT** on corridors like Argyle, Sauchiehall, Great Western Road, Paisley Road West, London Road, Easterhouse.
 - **Hardened slab construction** with utilities largely in situ.
 - **Coupled MRV sets** and 90–120 s headways where demand warrants.

“Clyde needs a metro where it is truly a metro city, and a tram where it is a tram city. The current methodology only sees the metro half of that truth.”

The required step change is therefore not a minor adjustment to the existing appraisal. It is a reset of the organising principle.

Clyde Metro should cease to ask, “How do we deliver a segregated metro?” and instead ask, “What combination of metro, tram, VLR/LR/TRAM MRT, heavy-rail conversion and street-space reallocation delivers the greatest capacity, accessibility, public-health benefit, carbon reduction and social value for each corridor?”

That shift would bring the programme back into line with modern appraisal discipline and with the best European practice it currently fails to test.



Likely pattern of Clyde Metro penetration

Based on how it's been framed so far, a **segregated, rail-corridor-heavy Clyde Metro** will tend to:

- **Follow existing heavy rail and motorway corridors**
 - Strong for park-and-ride and regional commuting.
 - Weaker for **deep penetration into housing estates** and local high-need neighbourhoods.
- **Serve major centres and interchanges**
 - City centre, big hospitals, universities, key town centres.
 - Good for “headline” accessibility metrics.
- **Skim past, rather than enter, many areas of transport poverty**
 - Peripheral estates, radial corridors with poor bus reliability, areas with **low car ownership** but **no rail station**.
 - These are exactly the places where **street-running LRT/MRV** can go to the front door—and Metro often doesn't.

So: yes, it will touch some high-need areas, but no, it will not systematically penetrate the fine-grain of transport poverty in the way a tram-led network can.

Where Metro tends to underperform on social outcomes

Transport poverty, unemployment, poor air quality are usually concentrated in:

- Radial arterial corridors with cheap housing and heavy traffic.
- Inner-suburban estates built away from rail lines.
- Junction towns where buses are slow and unreliable.

A segregated Metro that:

- Reuses existing rail alignments, and
- Avoids street running on those very arterials

will often:

- Improve regional access for those who can reach a station.
- Leave many low-income households still dependent on slow buses or long walks to rail.

In other words: it improves the map, but not necessarily the front-door reality.



What a VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/Tram/MRT layer does differently

Purpose of the street-running layer

A street-running VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT/MRT layer is not an optional embellishment to Clyde Metro. It is the part of the network that reaches the streets, households and communities least well served by a segregated metro-only model.

Its purpose is different from a rail-led metro spine. It does not simply move people between major nodes; it changes daily accessibility in the neighbourhoods where transport poverty, poor air quality, low car ownership and weak access to employment are most concentrated.

Following the problem, not bypassing it

The decisive advantage of street-running tram-based transit is that it follows the urban problem itself. Glasgow's worst air-quality corridors are not abstract regional lines on a map; they are A-roads, distributor roads and dense tenement streets where people live, shop, work, study and wait for unreliable buses.

A metro-only network may improve regional connectivity, but it risks passing near these communities rather than entering them. A street-running VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT/MRT layer walks into the problem.

Front-door access and social reach

With stops every 300–500 metres, the benefit becomes practical rather than theoretical.

Tenement residents, flat dwellers, lower-car-ownership estates, shift workers, students, older people and those travelling to local services are placed within a short, legible walk of high-frequency transit.

That is a different public-value proposition from a smaller number of widely spaced stations. It is not simply transport capacity; it is social reach.

Air quality and street-space reallocation

The same intervention tackles air quality at source. By reallocating street space from general traffic to electric rail transit, walking and cycling, the programme can reduce traffic dominance on the streets where exposure is highest.

Cleaner vehicles alone do not solve non-exhaust emissions, congestion, delay or severance. Steel-wheel, high-capacity street transit combined with road-space reallocation does.

Economic inclusion and everyday destinations

It also strengthens economic inclusion. The jobs most relevant to many lower-income households are not only at large regional hubs; they are in retail, care, hospitality, education, health, logistics and local services spread along streets and district centres.

A street-running layer serves those everyday destinations directly. It improves access to work, training, colleges, health facilities and local centres without forcing passengers through unnecessary interchange or long walks to rail stations.


This is why Vienna, Zurich, Budapest, Basel and Amsterdam use trams as social infrastructure as well as transport infrastructure: they combine capacity with frontage access, corridor regeneration, air-quality improvement and everyday mobility.



A question we put to Clyde Metro

“Show, on a deprivation and car-ownership map, where Clyde Metro actually penetrates the worst transport poverty—and where it simply runs past on existing rail lines.”

And then show the same map with high-capacity street-running corridors added on Argyle, Sauchiehall, Great Western Road, Paisley Road West, etc.



Indicative schematic only: red shows Clyde Metro-style segregated/regional corridors; green shows proposed street-running VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT/MRT corridors penetrating dense urban streets and high-need neighbourhoods.

Which network actually walks into the problem?”

Our conclusions: the **hybrid Metro + street LRT/MRV** network will:

- Reach **lower-income households** within a 400–600 m walk either side of the street track.
- Deliver **bigger air-quality gains** on the streets where people actually live.
- Offer **better access to everyday jobs**, not just city-centre and regional nodes.

“As currently framed, Clyde Metro will improve regional connectivity, but without a street-running layer it will not fully penetrate the neighbourhoods with the worst transport poverty, air quality and unemployment. A hybrid Metro + tram network



Construction – “Spades in the Ground?”

The core issue: a flawed definition became programme strategy

This is not simply a story of a slow project. It is a case of time being lost because a flawed definition was allowed to harden into strategy, appraisal and programme design. Once SPTR1 defined “mass transit” in a way that excluded modern tram and MRT-scale VLR/LR/TRAM MRT solutions, the option set was narrowed before any genuinely mode-neutral assessment had taken place.

SPTR2 did not correct that error. Instead, it carried the same framing forward, entrenching a policy-led exclusion in place of an evidence-led comparison.

The practical consequence: deferred public value

The result is a material loss of time, not merely a procedural delay. From SPTR1 through STPR2, NPF4 and the current Case for Investment, Glasgow has spent years progressing a programme whose underlying premise was already constrained.

During that period, the city did not merely fail to build a metro. It also failed to test and progress lower-cost, faster-to-deliver street-running options that could have served the communities with the greatest transport poverty, the worst air quality and the lowest life expectancy. In ministerial terms, this is not simply deferred delivery; it is deferred public value.

Who was left waiting

The loss is institutional as much as technical. A definition shaped the appraisal; the appraisal shaped the corridor choices; and the corridor choices shaped who was left waiting.

In practical terms, the East End and Southside were not just underserved by a long development cycle. They were disadvantaged by a decision framework that privileged segregation, wider-road geometry and metro-style assumptions over direct service to the places of highest need.

This amounts to a structured deferral of the options most likely to deliver early social, health and regeneration benefit.

Why the timeline matters

Since the original error went uncorrected, the programme has advanced through review, endorsement, governance and business-case development, and is now in Stage 2 appraisal—yet still without construction. Presented administratively, that may be described as progress. Presented objectively, it is also years spent elaborating a narrowed premise rather than correcting it.

The consequence is that Glasgow has lost time not only in transport delivery terms, but also in public health, accessibility, economic participation and social justice terms.

This is not merely a delayed project; it is a decade of avoidable delay created by allowing a flawed definition to become the organising principle of policy, appraisal and programme development.



Lessons from West Yorkshire

West Yorkshire offers a useful comparison, but it should not be overstated. The issue is not whether Clyde Metro will face the same outcome, but whether similar risks arise when programme momentum advances before the evidential base is sufficiently secure.

The relevant lesson is one of sequencing. Major transport programmes are exposed when strategic commitment, political momentum and consultancy spend run ahead of a genuinely comparative appraisal.

For Clyde Metro, the concern is therefore about process robustness rather than direct equivalence. If the programme continues to develop around a definition of “mass transit” that narrows the option set before full comparison, it risks the criticism that appraisal discipline has followed strategic commitment, rather than preceding it.

In that position, further development expenditure becomes harder to defend if government later concludes that the option set must be reopened or that key decisions were taken prematurely.

The stronger and safer position is to show, transparently, that high-capacity street-running options were fairly tested before any narrowing of scope became embedded in strategy, appraisal or delivery planning.

Core lesson: major transport programmes are vulnerable when strategic momentum runs ahead of robust comparative appraisal.

The risk is not only delay, but the accumulation of public development spend before the underlying case is proven.

For Clyde Metro, the safeguard is clear: demonstrate genuine mode-neutral appraisal before further programme commitment hardens around a narrowed definition.



Clyde Metro main construction.

As of June 2026, Clyde Metro should be treated as a programme at a critical delivery-risk point, not simply as a project moving steadily through normal development.

It remains in the Case for Investment stage, with the programme-level business case not expected until early 2027.

Even on the current timetable, construction remains beyond further appraisal, engineering design, funding approval, statutory processes and procurement.

The prognosis is therefore serious: unless the programme is reset around a deliverable first phase and a genuinely mode-neutral option set, Clyde Metro risks becoming a long-running strategic aspiration rather than an implementable transport intervention.

That creates a significant public-value exposure. After years of policy development, consultancy activity, governance work and business-case preparation, the programme still lacks the basic markers of delivery credibility: no confirmed route, no committed capital funding, no statutory powers, no procurement timetable, no ordered vehicles, no stations or track under construction, and no measurable passenger benefit on the ground.

The risk is not merely delay; it is that public funding continues to support process maturity while delivery maturity remains weak.

This is the central accountability problem. Clyde Metro has produced studies, definitions, option narratives, governance structures and programme language; it has not yet produced new capacity, shorter journeys, cleaner streets, improved access to employment, or relief for the communities carrying the heaviest transport-poverty and air-quality burden.

In public-value terms, the programme is spending real money now against benefits that remain undefined, unfunded and distant.

The criticism is not that major transport schemes require appraisal; they plainly do. The criticism is that Clyde Metro appears to have spent substantial time and public money developing a narrowed construct before proving that lower-cost, faster-to-deliver, high-capacity street-running LRT/MRV alternatives were fairly tested.

That is a profound weakness.

Expenditure that clarifies a genuinely open choice is defensible; expenditure that elaborates a prematurely narrowed premise is much harder to justify.



On the present trajectory, Clyde Metro is at risk of becoming a “castle in the air” project: ambitious, visually attractive and institutionally active, but insufficiently anchored to a deliverable first phase, a funding route, a statutory pathway, a procurement plan and a tested value-for-money comparison against modern street-running alternatives.

The delivery tests should now be explicit and non-negotiable: identify the first buildable corridor; publish the mode choice and why it outperforms MRV-scale street-running LRT; set out the capital funding path; define the statutory powers required; establish procurement readiness; and show the cost per passenger, cost per kilometre, cost per unit of social benefit and expected date of first passenger service.

The question for decision-makers is therefore no longer whether a Clyde Metro concept is desirable in principle.

Most large transit visions are desirable in principle.

The real test is whether this programme, in its current form, is capable of converting public expenditure into construction, operation and social benefit within a credible timeframe.

If the answer remains uncertain, then the programme requires more than another stage of consultancy refinement.

It requires a reset: a corridor-first appraisal, a reinstatement of high-capacity street-running LRT/MRV as a valid mass-transit option, and a public commitment to an early, buildable phase capable of delivering visible benefits.

Continued expenditure should therefore be conditional on a stricter gateway test: what physical outcome will be delivered, on which corridor, by what date, under what statutory powers, at what capital cost, with what operating model, and with what measurable benefit for passengers, deprived communities, air quality, health and access to work?

Until those answers are provided, the programme’s development spend remains exposed to legitimate challenge. The danger is not only that Clyde Metro is delayed; it is that delay becomes normalised, appraisal becomes self-referential, and public money continues to flow into programme development without a corresponding increase in delivery certainty.

A project can be visionary and still be poorly sequenced. It can be strategically attractive and still fail the near-term delivery test. It can generate impressive reports and still leave passengers, communities and health outcomes untouched. That is the present risk.

The prognosis is clear: without a reset, Clyde Metro risks consuming further years and further public money while remaining short of the one test that matters most — a funded, authorised, buildable first phase that reaches the communities the present construct has left waiting.



Qualitative Comparison Table — Metro-Only vs Hybrid Network

Metro-only vs Hybrid (Metro + Street-running VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT/MRT) assessed against transport poverty, air quality, unemployment, and access to services, followed by a value-for-money conclusion for Glasgow.

Outcome Area	Metro-only	Hybrid Metro + Street LRT/MRV
Transport poverty	Serves major nodes but misses many estates located away from rail corridors. Benefits are corridor-focused, not neighbourhood-penetrating. “Reaches roughly one-third more low-income households within a 400–600 m walk of a stop.”	Direct penetration into high-need areas via street corridors (Argyle, GWR, PRW, Duke St). Stops every 300–500 m → front-door access for low-income households. “Likely to place 20–30% more low-income households within a 400–600 m walk of a stop, compared with a rail-led metro-only network.”
Air quality	Improvements mainly around rail corridors, not the polluted A-roads where people live. Limited impact on street-level emissions.	on the very streets with the worst pollution. Reallocation of road space reduces traffic volumes and idling.
Unemployment & job access	Strong for regional commuting, weaker for local job clusters (retail, care, logistics,). Long walks to stations remain a barrier, especially in inclement Scottish weather. Hospitality .	Frequent stops + street penetration → shorter access times to everyday jobs. Better for shift workers, part-time workers, and low-income jobseekers.
Access to services	Good for hospitals, universities, city centre. Poor for local health centres, colleges, retail strips, and community services.	High-resolution access to local services along corridors. Strong uplift for health, education, and retail access in deprived areas.
Urban regeneration	Focused on station nodes → punctual regeneration, not corridor-wide.	Linear regeneration along whole streets, echoing Glasgow’s tenement legacy, where first-generation tram routes followed and helped sustain dense residential corridors and local shopping streets. Proven European model (Vienna, Zurich, Basel).
Cost & risk	High capital cost due to segregation, structures, utility diversions. Risk of demolition in constrained areas.	Lower cost: hardened slab, utilities in situ, nil demolition. Risk is policy (street reallocation), not engineering.
Network effect	Strong radial spine but weak mesh. Many communities remain “near but not on” the network.	Strengthens direct access to Paisley town centre through a street-running connector.



Value for Money: Why a Metro-Only Clyde Metro Fails Glasgow's Core Test

A metro-only scheme may offer value for regional commuting, but it cannot be regarded as best value for Glasgow citizens if it fails to reach the communities where transport poverty, poor air quality, low car ownership, unemployment and weak access to services are most concentrated.

The value-for-money question is not whether Clyde Metro is desirable. It is whether the present metro-only construct delivers the greatest public value per pound.

On that test, the current construct is weak. It concentrates investment around segregated alignments, rail corridors and major nodes, while many of Glasgow's highest-need neighbourhoods sit on street corridors, tenement belts, radial A-roads and inner-suburban estates that require direct, frequent, street-level access.

A programme can produce impressive regional connectivity and still fail the everyday access test for the citizens most in need.

Transport poverty is concentrated in neighbourhoods, not merely at regional interchange points

The worst deprivation in Glasgow is in:

- Inner-suburban estates
- Tenement belts
- Radial A-roads with poor bus reliability
- Areas with low car ownership but no rail station

A Metro that remains tied to segregated alignments can improve the map while still leaving thousands of low-income households dependent on slow buses, long walks or difficult interchange. That is not best value; it is partial value.

The air-quality problem is located on the streets a metro-only network tends to avoid

The worst pollution is on:

- Argyle Street
- Great Western Road
- Paisley Road West
- Alexandra Parade
- Duke Street

These are not abstract corridors; they are lived-in streets. A metro-only system may move people efficiently between nodes, but it does not by itself reduce traffic dominance, idling, severance or non-exhaust emissions on the streets where exposure is highest.



Employment access is local, dispersed and street-based

Most unemployed Glaswegians work in:

- Retail
- Care
- Hospitality
- Logistics
- Local services

If employment access is dispersed along streets, then a station-led regional network is not enough. The value-for-money test must include access to everyday jobs, not only access to major centres.

4. The Metro-only construct risks paying more to reach less

A segregated metro-style approach is likely to carry higher capital cost, greater statutory complexity, longer lead times and increased exposure to land, utility and civil-engineering risk. If that higher cost does not also secure materially better penetration into high-need communities, then the value-for-money case is weakened.

Spending more is justifiable only where it delivers more public value.

It is not justified where it delivers a more expensive network that still passes around the problem rather than entering it.

A hybrid network offers higher social return on capital

A hybrid network uses Metro where segregation is genuinely justified by regional flows, geometry and value for money, and uses street-running LRT/MRV where Glasgow needs frontage access, short stop spacing, road-space reallocation, local regeneration and direct penetration into transport-poor communities.

This approach does not dilute Clyde Metro; it makes it deliverable, socially useful and better aligned with the actual geography of need.

The conclusion is robust: a Metro-only Clyde Metro may be a transport project, but a hybrid Metro + street-running LRT/MRV network is the stronger public-value proposition for Glasgow.



A Hybrid network is not optional It is essential!

A hybrid network should be treated as a core requirement of Clyde Metro, not as a later enhancement. The primary test is whether the programme delivers the greatest public value for Glasgow, not whether it produces the most visually ambitious regional network. Metro should be retained where regional, cross-city capacity genuinely requires segregation. Street-running LRT/MRV should be used where dense urban corridors require direct access, frequent stops, frontage activity and true neighbourhood penetration.

This is not a speculative add-on. It is the established European model used in Vienna, Zurich, Budapest, Basel and Amsterdam. In those cities, high-capacity tram corridors perform functions that metro and rail systems cannot deliver alone: they reach streets, shopfronts, homes, workplaces, colleges and everyday services that regional infrastructure would otherwise miss.

Without the hybrid layer, Clyde Metro cannot meet Glasgow's statutory, economic or social public-value test.

The case should therefore be structured by seniority of requirement:

1. Public-value and appraisal requirement

Under modern Green Book appraisal practice, the stronger option is the one that maximises monetisable and non-monetisable public value. A hybrid network meets that test because it does more than move passengers between major nodes: it reduces measurable harm along the corridors where need is greatest.

- **2. Health, air quality and non-exhaust emissions:** steel-wheel transit reduces tyre, brake and road-wear particulates compared with rubber-tyred traffic, while street-space reallocation reduces idling, congestion and exposure to PM2.5 and NO2 on the very streets where people live.
- **3. NHS and public-health savings:** fewer respiratory and cardiovascular admissions, fewer chronic illness cases and lower health-service demand should be treated as real public-sector savings, not as narrative co-benefits.
- **4. Transport poverty and front-door access:** frequent street-running stops place more low-income households within a short, legible walk of high-capacity transit, reducing dependence on slow buses, long walks and difficult interchange.
- **5. Economic inclusion:** better access to jobs, colleges, health services and local centres can be valued through employment access, productivity, reduced absenteeism and wider social-value metrics.
- **6. Road, asset and drainage savings:** modal shift away from cars, vans and buses reduces road-surface wear, pothole formation, cleansing demand, deposited rubber and brake residue, and pressure on carriageway renewal and drainage assets.



This strengthens the VLR/LR/TRAM MRT case because benefits often treated as “soft” can be expressed as measurable public value: cleaner air, reduced NHS demand, lower non-exhaust particulate exposure, lower road-maintenance pressure, wider access to work and services, and corridor-level regeneration.

- **7. Deliverability:** the hybrid approach avoids building demolition, keeps most utilities in place, reduces the need for major diversion programmes, and lowers capital cost, delivery risk and programme exposure.
- **8. Social reach:** it reaches deeper into the neighbourhoods carrying the greatest transport-poverty burden and improves access to everyday jobs, colleges, health services and local centres.
- **9. Regeneration:** it supports corridor-wide regeneration rather than isolated station-node uplift, because it brings high-frequency transit directly to frontage streets and local centres.

The value-for-money case is therefore not marginally better; it is fundamentally stronger. A hybrid network buys more access, more health benefit, more social inclusion, more regeneration and more deliverability for each pound spent.

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A Metro-only Clyde Metro cannot meet Glasgow’s modern public-value test. It may improve movement between major regional nodes, but it cannot credibly claim to address transport poverty, air-quality exposure, employment exclusion or health inequality if it fails to penetrate the neighbourhoods where those harms are concentrated.

A high-cost system that passes near deprived communities is not enough. Clyde Metro must reach them directly.

The strategic case

The case for a modern hybrid Clyde Metro is therefore not optional or marginal. It is now the stronger strategic, economic, appraisal and social case. Metro should be retained where segregation is justified by regional flows, geometry and value for money, but it must be complemented by a street-running LRT/MRV layer on dense urban corridors.

That layer is the mechanism that delivers front-door access, shorter stop spacing, lower construction risk, reduced non-exhaust emissions, improved air quality, NHS savings, road-maintenance savings, corridor regeneration and better access to everyday jobs and services.

Under modern Green Book appraisal, many of these benefits can be monetised or explicitly valued rather than dismissed as soft co-benefits. Without the hybrid layer, Clyde Metro risks becoming a high-cost regional network that improves the map while failing Glasgow’s front-door reality test.

With the hybrid layer, Clyde Metro becomes a deliverable, place-based and outcome-led mass-transit programme capable of meeting Glasgow’s real public-value test.



Who Metro Misses vs Who the Hybrid Network Reaches

City Centre & Inner Core

Metro-only

- Strong penetration of Queen Street, Central, Buchanan Street, and the core commercial district.
- Good for regional commuting and city-centre jobs.

But limited reach into the dense tenement belts immediately beyond the centre.

N.B.

Hybrid

- Street-running MRV/LRT corridors on Argyle Street, Sauchiehall Street, High Street, Duke Street, and Gorbals Street provide fine-grain access into the inner core.
- Captures thousands of households within 300–800 m of stops.
- East End: Dennistoun, Haghill, Carntyne, Parkhead, London Road, Maukinfauld Rd.

North Glasgow and the Southside show why a metro-only Clyde Metro is not enough. A rail-led network may serve Springburn and the Cathcart Circle, but it does not properly reach Possil, Milton, Royston, Cowlares, Sighthill, Govanhill, Pollokshields, Strathbungo or Shawlands.

These are high-need, low-car-ownership communities where unemployment, poor bus reliability and air-quality exposure make direct street-level transit essential. A Springburn Road–Garscube Road VLR/MRV corridor would take high-frequency transit into Possil, Milton and the Sighthill regeneration zone, giving direct access to the city centre and Queen Street without forcing residents through long walks, weak feeder buses or difficult interchange.

On the Southside, Victoria Road, Pollokshaws Road and Kilmarnock Road require the same treatment. Govanhill is not adequately rail-served, Pollokshields has stations but weak street-level access, and the dense A77 corridor remains dominated by traffic, congestion and pollution.



Institutional lessons: Glasgow's own tram history was excluded

Clyde Metro re invented an expensive version of re inventing the Wheel

A further weakness in the Clyde Metro appraisal is the apparent exclusion of Glasgow's own tramway experience as a source of technical and operational guidance.

This is not a minor historical omission.

Glasgow operated one of the largest and most sophisticated street-running tram systems in Britain, and its later fleet embodied many of the principles now associated with modern VLR/MRV design: double-bogie vehicles, high passenger capacity, street operation, frequent stopping, strong frontage access and close integration with dense urban corridors.

Most of Glasgow's tramcars in the final decades of operation were double-bogie cars.

The Kilmarnock Bogie cars, Coronations and Cunarders were not primitive local shuttles; they were substantial urban vehicles designed to carry significant passenger loads through precisely the kind of dense streets now being assessed for Clyde Metro.

In modern terms, they were much closer to the MRV/VLR lineage than to the small 50-passenger demonstrator vehicles used to characterise VLR in the appraisal.

That matters because Glasgow's historic tramway provides a local evidence base for how high-capacity street-running vehicles can work in tenement streets, shopping corridors, radial roads and mixed-traffic urban conditions.

It shows that street-running rail was not an imported novelty or a speculative innovation; it was the proven operating form that shaped Glasgow's urban growth and outperformed heavy rail for many everyday journeys because it served the front door rather than the distant station.

The omission is especially significant in relation to E.R.L. Fitzpayne and Glasgow Corporation Transport's post-war modernisation thinking. Fitzpayne's work on lightweight, electrically powered, lower-infrastructure urban transit anticipated many of the design priorities now associated with VLR: reduced vehicle mass, electric traction, lower infrastructure burden, high urban capacity and suitability for medium-to-high demand street corridors.

That historical lineage should have been part of any serious mode comparison.

By failing to draw on that local history, the appraisal appears to have replaced Glasgow-specific evidence with a simplified policy category: VLR as small, local and low-to-medium capacity.



That is the wrong comparison. The correct historical comparison is between Glasgow's double-bogie street tram tradition and modern MRV-scale VLR/LRT vehicles capable of carrying 200–400 passengers in single or coupled formations.

The conclusion is clear: Clyde Metro did not simply exclude a modern technology option; it excluded a rich source of Glasgow's own operational wisdom.

The city had already demonstrated the principles of high-capacity street-running rails.

The policy construct ignored that inheritance and treated VLR/MRV as though Glasgow had no relevant tramway evidence of its own.

Between 2015 and 2024, the institutional lesson drawn from Edinburgh Phase 1 appears to have hardened into a systematic appraisal bias.

What began as understandable caution about governance, utilities, contracts and delivery risk was gradually translated into a much broader—and much less defensible—assumption: that street-running tram and VLR/MRV systems should be treated as inherently secondary to heavy rail, metro-style segregation and bus priority.

By 2015–2018, this “safe mode” thinking had become embedded in appraisal practice. Transport Scotland's frameworks increasingly favoured heavy rail, segregated metro geometry and bus-based interventions, while giving little serious consideration to the continental model of high-capacity street-running tramways.

The effect was not neutral. It signaled to consultants and promoters that segregated solutions were institutionally preferred, while street-running options were treated as legacy, local or lower-order modes rather than as serious mass-transit candidates.

That bias then became explicit in the framing of Clyde Metro between 2019 and 2021. By defining Clyde Metro as “high-capacity, high-frequency, segregated mass transit” and defining VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT as “local, low to medium capacity, street-running transit”, the appraisal framework excluded the relevant option before it was properly tested. MRV3 and MRV4-scale vehicles capable of carrying 200–300 passengers were not rejected because they failed a capacity test; they were removed before the correct capacity test was applied.

SPTR2 then reinforced rather than corrected the error. Between 2022 and 2024, the appraisal still appears not to have tested the key modern alternatives: hardened-slab construction, utilities-in-situ design, coupled MRV operation, high-frequency street running, and the Budapest, Vienna and Zurich precedents.

The result was a programme increasingly shaped by a metro-only imagination rather than by a mode-neutral assessment of what Glasgow's corridors actually need.

The message is therefore stark: Edinburgh Phase 1 did not merely influence risk management; it appears to have created an institutional reflex that converted a governance failure into a modal exclusion.

Clyde Metro is one of the clearest consequences of that reflex.



Light Rail (UK)

Those fears appear to have hardened into a segregation-first policy construct that prioritises risk avoidance over Glasgow's actual street-level transport needs.

A hybrid Metro + street-running VLR/MRV network corrects that failure by restoring the mode, corridor and access choices needed to reach the communities a metro-only construct would leave waiting.





The West End and South-West

Sharpens the class contrast in the Clyde Metro debate.

Existing rail and Subway services already give relatively strong access to Partick, Hyndland, Kelvinhall and Hillhead, while Great Western Road, Maryhill Road, Paisley Road West, Ibrox, Bellahouston, Cardonald and Halfway remain heavily bus-dependent, traffic-exposed and more reliant on everyday local journeys.

A Clyde Metro-only programme risks concentrating on new investment around already transport-rich districts and interchange nodes, while the corridors with weaker household mobility, lower car ownership and greater exposure to air pollution remain dependent on slow buses and long walks to rail.

This is not a crude argument about geography; it is a public-value argument about who benefits first. A rail-led Metro will naturally perform well where stations, interchanges and higher-value development markets already exist.

Street-running VLR/LR/TRAM/MRT performs a different social function: it reaches the tenement belts, arterial roads, local centres and mixed-use corridors where lower-income households, shift workers, students, older residents and non-car households make daily trips to shops, health services, colleges and local employment.

Without that layer, Clyde Metro risks becoming a progressive-sounding project with a regressive distributional outcome: major capital investment improving access for areas already comparatively well connected, while the highest-need corridors continue to carry the health, air-quality and transport-poverty burden.

A hybrid network corrects that imbalance by adding the street-level layer that reaches the places where deprivation is lived, not merely measured.

The conclusion is clear: a metro-only Clyde Metro may reinforce access for the transport-rich; a hybrid Metro + street-running VLR/LR/TRAM MRT network is the route to transport justice because it puts high-frequency transit into the streets, districts and households that need it most.



North Glasgow and the Southside

Strengthen the case for a hybrid Clyde Metro because they show precisely where a metro-only construct fails.

A rail-led or segregated alignment may improve regional movement, but it does not automatically resolve the lived transport deficit in Possil, Milton, Royston, Cowlares, Sighthill, Gorbals, Govanhill, Pollokshields, Strathbungo and Shawlands.

These are not marginal catchments; they are high-need neighbourhoods where low car ownership, unemployment, poor bus reliability, air-quality exposure and weak access to everyday services make direct street-level transit essential.

In North Glasgow, serving Springburn by rail is not the same as solving the access problem for Possil, Milton, Royston, Cowlares and the Sighthill regeneration zone.

A resident who must walk too far, wait for an unreliable feeder bus, or make an awkward interchange before reaching the higher-capacity network has not been given a proper mass-transit offer.

A Springburn Road–Garscube Road VLR/MRV corridor would correct that weakness by taking the service into the communities themselves, giving direct, frequent and legible access to the city centre, Queen Street and the wider network.

The Southside presents the same issue in a different form.

The Cathcart Circle and existing rail network are valuable, but they do not provide the stop-level penetration required on Victoria Road, Pollokshaws Road and Kilmarnock Road. Govanhill, Pollokshields, Strathbungo and Shawlands are dense, mixed-use, street-based communities where daily journeys are made to shops, colleges, health centres, cultural venues, local employers and public services.

A station-led model cannot substitute for a high-frequency street-running corridor that people can reach within a short, obvious walk.

A Victoria Road–Pollokshaws Road–Kilmarnock Road LRT/MRT corridor would therefore deliver more than transport capacity. It would provide frontage access, support local employment, improve access to health and education, enable corridor regeneration and intervene directly on the A77 air-quality problem.

By replacing traffic-dominated street space with steel-wheel electric transit, walking and cycling, the hybrid option attacks non-exhaust emissions, idling, severance and congestion at source.

This strengthens our case because it exposes the central flaw in the current construct: Clyde Metro appears to have been shaped more by institutional caution after Edinburgh Phase 1 than by Glasgow's actual geography of need.



Light Rail (UK)

Avoiding another Edinburgh Phase 1 disaster is a legitimate governance objective; allowing that fear to exclude modern street-running VLR/MRV from proper appraisal is not.

Glasgow should not be asked to accept a higher-cost, slower-to-deliver, station-led network if a street-running layer can deliver capacity, access, health benefit and social value more directly.

The conclusion is clear: North Glasgow and the Southside do not need a Clyde Metro that merely passes near them; they need a hybrid network that reaches them. The VLR/MRT layer is the mechanism that turns Clyde Metro from a regional concept into a front-door public-value intervention.



Photo: Andrew Leyden/ZUMA Press



North Glasgow: Possil, Milton, Springburn

Clyde Metro-only

- Springburn rail corridor is served, but:
 - Possil, Milton, Royston, Cowlares, Sighthill remain poorly connected.
 - These areas have low car ownership, high unemployment, and poor bus reliability.

Hybrid

- Springburn Road / Garscube Road street-running corridor reaches:
 - Possil
 - Milton
 - Sighthill regeneration zone
 - Provides direct access to city centre and Queen Street in minutes.

Southside: Gorbals, Govanhill, Pollokshields, Shawlands

Metro-only

- Strong on Cathcart Circle and Southside rail, but:
 - Govanhill (one of Scotland's highest deprivation concentrations) is not rail-served.
 - Pollokshields East/West have stations, but street-level access is poor.
 - Victoria Road, Pollokshaws Road, Kilmarnock Road — all high-density corridors — are missed.

Hybrid

- **Victoria Road / Pollokshaws Road LRT/MRV:**
 - Directly penetrates Govanhill, Pollokshields, Strathbungo, Shawlands.
 - Serves **local jobs, shops, health centres, colleges, cultural venues**.
 - Major air-quality improvements on **A77**.

Clyde Metro appears to be driven more by Transport Scotland's desire to avoid another Edinburgh Phase 1, than by Glasgow's actual transport needs.



West End: Partick, Hyndland, Hillhead, Maryhill

Metro-only

- Good for **Partick, Hyndland, Kelvinhall, Hillhead** via existing rail and Subway.
- But **Great Western Road** and **Maryhill Road** — two of Glasgow's busiest corridors — remain **bus-only**.

Hybrid

- **Great Western Road LRT/MRV:**
 - Serves Hillhead, Kelvinbridge, St George's Cross, Woodside.
- **Maryhill Road LRT/MRV:**
 - Reaches Maryhill, Summerston, Wyndford (high deprivation cluster).
- Provides **continuous, high-frequency access** to the West End spine.

South-West: Govan, Ibrox, Cardonald, Paisley Road West

Metro-only

- Strong around **Govan Interchange** and **QEUH**, but:
 - **Paisley Road West (PRW)** — one of Glasgow's most important corridors — is **not rail-served**.
 - **Cardonald, Halfway, Bellahouston, Ibrox** remain dependent on slow buses.

Hybrid

- **PRW LRT/MRV:**
 - Directly penetrates Ibrox, Bellahouston, Cardonald, Halfway.
 - Major uplift in **air quality, job access, and local regeneration**.
- Links to Govan, QEUH, and the Metro spine.



LR/TRAM/MRT makes the stronger case

The East End

Is the clearest test of whether Clyde Metro is being designed around public value or around inherited infrastructure assumptions.

A metro-only alignment following existing rail corridors such as Bellgrove, Carntyne and Shettleston may improve regional connectivity, but it does not solve the East End's street-level transport problem.

The problem is not simply the absence of another rail-side station; it is the absence of direct, frequent, legible transit on the lived-in corridors where deprivation, poor air quality, low car ownership, bus dependency and weak access to everyday employment are most concentrated.

Duke Street, Alexandra Parade, London Road and Parkhead Cross are not peripheral links to be reached after interchange; they are the transport problem itself.

They are dense frontage canyon type corridors where people live above shops, travel to local work, access health and education, and depend on buses operating in traffic.

A network that passes nearby on rail alignments but does not enter these streets risks improving the regional map while leaving the daily journey problem substantially unchanged.

Duke Street is exactly the type of corridor for which a street-running VLR/LR/TRAM/MRT system is designed. It has continuous frontage activity, dense tenement catchments, short local trips, constrained household budgets and high dependence on public transport.

A stop pattern at roughly 300–500 metres would place households, shops, schools, health services and local employers within a short, understandable walk of high-frequency electric rail transit.

That is a materially different access proposition from asking residents to walk to, or interchange onto, a rail-side metro stop.

Alexandra Parade and London Road strengthen the case further. These corridors combine heavy bus movements, general traffic, idling, severance, non-exhaust emissions and local exposure to poor air quality, the latter being the core of "Calton Man" issue.

Reallocating road space to steel-wheel electric transit would not merely provide a transport service; it would intervene directly in the environmental and public-health burden carried by the corridor.

Under modern appraisal practice, that benefit should be valued through air-quality improvement, avoided illness, reduced NHS demand, lower road-maintenance pressure and improved access to work and services.



Parkhead Cross is equally important. It is a deprivation, interchange, retail, employment and local-service cluster that requires stop-level penetration, not a distant catchment assumption.

A VLR/LR/TRAM/MRT corridor serving Parkhead directly would support everyday trips to shops, the Forge, health services, local employment, schools, colleges and onward interchange.

It would also provide a visible first-phase intervention in one of the corridors where transport poverty and poor health outcomes make early delivery most defensible.

The capacity case also supports VLR/LR/TRAM/MRT rather than undermining it. VLR/LR/TRAM/MRT scale vehicles operating singly or in coupled sets can provide the capacity required for dense urban corridors while retaining the decisive advantage of street access.

The relevant comparison is not a 50-passenger demonstrator against a metro train; it is an MRT-scale tram formation against the actual passenger demand, stop spacing and street geometry of the East End.

On that corrected comparison, VLR/LR/TRAM/MRT is not a minor option. It is a credible mass-transit intervention with lower construction risk and greater social reach.

The deliverability case is equally strong. A hardened-slab VLR/LR/TRAM/MRT approach can be delivered within the existing carriageway, with most utilities retained in situ, no building demolition, no deep excavation and construction risk concentrated around managed street-space reallocation.

That makes the East End a practical candidate for an early, buildable phase: visible, socially targeted, lower risk, and capable of demonstrating benefits before a fully segregated metro-style programme could reach construction.

The conclusion is robust: in the East End, a metro-only may pass near the problem, but a Duke Street–Alexandra Parade–London Road–Parkhead VLR/LR/TRAM/MRT corridor reaches it. VLR/LR/TRAM/MRT delivers capacity and proximity together: high-frequency transit, street-level access, air-quality intervention, lower delivery risk, monetisable public-health value and a credible first phase for the communities the present construct risks leaving behind.



Conclusion: VLR/LR/TRAM MRT is the missing delivery layer Clyde Metro now needs

The case for Very Light Rail is no longer a marginal technical argument.

It is the central delivery argument for a modern, affordable and socially useful Clyde Metro. The present segregation-first construct has produced a programme that is ambitious in language but weak in penetration, slow in delivery, exposed on cost and insufficiently targeted at the communities carrying the greatest burden of transport poverty, poor air quality, low car ownership and poor health.

VLR/LR/TRAM MRT changes that equation. It provides the street-level layer that a Clyde Metro-only network cannot deliver, frequent stops, frontage access, short walking catchments, direct service to local jobs and services, and the ability to enter dense tenement corridors, radial A-roads and high-need neighbourhoods rather than merely passing near them.

That is not an optional enhancement; it is the mechanism by which Clyde Metro becomes relevant to everyday Glasgow.

The capacity objection does not stand scrutiny when MRT-scale VLR/LR/TRAM/MRT is modelled correctly. Coupled MRV3 and MRV4 vehicles operating at short headways can meet or exceed the stated Clyde Metro demand envelope, while European practice demonstrates that street-running tram corridors can carry metro-scale flows in dense urban conditions.

The issue is therefore not whether VLR/LR/TRAM/MRT can provide capacity; it is whether the appraisal has been willing to test the right VLR/LR/TRAM/MRT.

The infrastructure case is equally strong. Hardened-slab VLR/LR/TRAM MRT construction allows most utilities to remain in situ, avoids deep excavation, requires no building demolition on the inner corridors identified, and makes street-space reallocation the principal intervention.

That means lower construction risk, lower capital exposure, shorter delivery timescales and a clearer route to an early buildable phase.

The public-value case is stronger still. VLR/LR/TRAM/MRT directly tackles the harm that a Clyde Metro-only network struggles to reach non-exhaust emissions, traffic dominance, idling, severance, poor local access, weak access to everyday employment, and the public-health burden carried by the East End, Southside and North Glasgow.



Light Rail (UK)

Under modern Green Book-style appraisal, these are not merely narrative co-benefits. They can be monetised or explicitly valued through air-quality gains, NHS savings, road-maintenance savings, productivity uplift, reduced absenteeism and wider social value. For that reason, the correct conclusion is not that Clyde Metro only should be abandoned.

It is that Clyde Metro must be redefined. Clyde Metro should be retained where segregation is genuinely justified by regional flows, geometry, safety and value for money.

But a street-running VLR/LR/TRAM/MRT layer must be restored as a core mass-transit component on the corridors where direct access, health improvement, air-quality intervention and regeneration benefits are greatest.

Without a street-running layer, many residents are still left with long walks, unreliable bus legs or awkward interchange before they reach the higher-capacity network.

The conclusion is clear: VLR/LR/TRAM/MRT is not the lesser alternative to Clyde Metro. It is the missing delivery layer that makes Clyde Metro credible, affordable, socially targeted and capable of reaching the communities the present construct risks leaving behind.



VLR/LR/TRAM/MRT solution

- A Duke Street–London Road VLR/LR/TRAM/MRT corridor would penetrate the East End at street level, serving the communities and destinations that a rail-led metro alignment tends to pass at the edge.
- Dennistoun and Haghill, with stops placed on the lived-in street rather than outside the neighbourhood.
- Parkhead and Forge/retail destinations, where everyday trips, jobs and services are concentrated.
- Carntyne and Shettleston, with high-frequency access that complements rather than duplicates rail.
- Calton, Bridgeton and London Road, where air-quality, health and deprivation burdens are among the strongest arguments for early intervention.
- Stops every 300–400 metres would place low-income households, shops, schools, colleges, health services and local employers within a short, legible walk of high-frequency transit.
- By reallocating road space on the A8/A89 corridor from general traffic to steel-wheel electric transit, VLR/LR/TRAM MRT would attack the pollution problem at source, including non-exhaust emissions, idling, congestion and severance.

The VLR/LR/TRAM MRT case is stronger because it delivers capacity and proximity together: metro-scale passenger movement, tram-scale access, lower construction risk, monetisable health and air-quality benefits, and a visible first phase that reaches the East End rather than merely passing nearby.



Who is *missed* vs who is *captured*

Metro-misses:

- Dennistoun / Haghill / Parkhead
- Possil / Milton / Sighthill
- Govanhill / Pollokshields / Strathbungo
- Maryhill / Wyndford
- Cardonald / Ibrox / Bellahouston / PRW corridor
- Alexandra Parade / Duke Street
- Great Western Road

These are exactly the neighbourhoods with:

- Highest transport poverty
- Worst air quality
- Lowest car ownership
- Highest unemployment
- Most bus dependency
- Weakest access to services

Hybrid network captures all of them.

Because street-running VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT/ MRT/ goes where people actually live, not where the railways happen to be.

“A Metro-only system improves regional connectivity, but it does not reach the neighbourhoods with the worst transport poverty.

A Hybrid Metro + Tram network penetrates the areas that need it most.”



Comparative accessibility — 400 m walking catchments (Metro-only vs Hybrid)

Dimension	Metro-only (segregated, rail-led)	Hybrid (Metro + Street LRT/MRV)
Core city centre	Very high coverage within 400 m (Queen St, Central, Buchanan, Subway).	Similar core coverage, plus denser stop pattern on Argyle, Sauchiehall, High St, Gorbals.
Most-deprived households within 400 m	Moderate: good around existing rail/subway, but patchy in inner estates and tenement belts.	High: adds continuous 400 m walk-catchments along Duke St, Alexandra Parade, GWR, Maryhill Rd, PRW, Victoria Rd, Pollokshaws Rd.
Low-car-ownership areas within 400 m	Concentrated around rail stations; many low-car estates sit 800–1,200 m away.	Substantially higher: street corridors run through low-car areas, not past them.
Jobs within 400 m	Strong for city centre, hospitals, universities, big nodes.	Adds linear job catchments: local retail, care, logistics, hospitality along main streets.
Schools, colleges, health centres within 400 m	Good for major hospitals and campuses; weaker for local services.	Markedly better: most local health centres, colleges, and high schools on main corridors fall within 400 m.
Air-pollution hotspots within 400 m	Limited: rail corridors are not where NO ₂ /PM peaks are.	High: GWR, PRW, Duke St, Alexandra Parade, Maryhill Rd, Victoria Rd all become transit corridors.
Network “holes” (areas >800 m from any stop)	Significant holes in Dennistoun, Haghill, Parkhead, Possil, Milton, Govanhill, Maryhill, Cardonald, PRW corridor.	Greatly reduced: most of these become continuous 400–600 m walk-sheds along tram corridors.

Plain-language conclusion: At a 400 m walk- catchment, Metro-only gives Glasgow a strong regional spine, but leaves large holes exactly where deprivation, low car ownership and poor air quality are worst.

The Hybrid network fills those holes by running high-capacity street VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT/MRT along the very corridors where people live, work and breathe the air.



Clyde Metro: Social Impact of Metro-only vs Hybrid Metro + Tram Network

1. Core questions (for Ministers or a Judicial review?)

Does the current Metro-only concept reach the people and places with the greatest need— or does it mainly improve journeys for those already close to rail?

2. What the 400 m catchments show

Metro-only (segregated, rail-led):

- **Strong** 400 m coverage in:
 - City centre, major hospitals, universities, existing rail/subway corridors.
- **Weak** 400 m coverage in:
 - Dennistoun, Haghill, Parkhead
 - Possil, Milton, Sighthill
 - Govanhill, Pollokshields, Strathbungo
 - Maryhill, Wyndford
 - Cardonald, Ibrox, Bellahouston, Paisley Road West
 - Alexandra Parade, Duke Street, Great Western Road

These are **exactly** the areas with:

- Highest transport poverty
- Lowest car ownership
- Worst air quality
- Highest unemployment

Hybrid (Metro + Street LRT/MRV):

- Keeps the Metro spine for regional flows.
- Adds high-capacity street corridors on:
 - Argyle / Sauchiehall / High St / Gorbals
 - Duke St / Alexandra Parade
 - Great Western Road / Maryhill Road
 - Victoria Rd / Pollokshaws Rd / Kilmarnock Rd
 - Paisley Road West

Result:

- Far more households in deprived areas within 400 m of a stop.
- More jobs, schools, colleges, health centres within easy reach.
- Air-quality improvements on the streets where pollution is worst.



Social outcomes comparison

Transport poverty

- **Metro-only:** Improves options for those already near rail; leaves many low-income estates reliant on slow buses.
- **Hybrid: Brings turn-up-and-go transit to the front door of high-need communities. Assuages last mile/first mile best practice alignment.**

Air quality

- **Metro-only:** Limited impact on polluted A-roads.
- **Hybrid:** Reallocates street space on the worst corridors, cutting traffic and emissions.

Unemployment and job access

- **Metro-only:** Strong for city-centre and regional jobs; weaker for dispersed local employment.
- **Hybrid:** Shortens access times to everyday jobs in retail, care, logistics and services along main streets.

Access to services

- **Metro-only:** Good for major hospitals and campuses.
- **Hybrid:** Adds **fine-grain access to local health centres, colleges, schools and town centres.**

Value-for-money implication

- **Metro-only** delivers clear benefits, but **under-delivers** where Glasgow's social problems are most acute.
- **Hybrid Metro + Tram:**
 - Reaches more deprived households within 400 m.
 - Delivers bigger air-quality and health gains.
 - Improves access to everyday jobs and services.
 - Does so with lower capital cost per beneficiary, because street LRT/MRV uses hardened slab, keeps utilities in situ, and avoids demolition.

“A Metro-only system improves regional connectivity, but a Hybrid Metro + Tram network delivers far greater social value per pound—because it actually reaches the people and streets with the greatest need.”



Light Rail (UK)

Timeline

How Edinburgh Tram Phase 1 Shaped Transport Scotland's Risk Culture

A timeline showing how Edinburgh Phase 1 influenced Transport Scotland's risk culture

The clean, authoritative, briefing-grade timeline for: How Edinburgh Tram Phase 1 shaped Transport Scotland's risk culture, and how that culture directly influenced Clyde Metro SPTR1 & SPTR2.

Structured it a chronological chain of institutional reactions, each linked to a behavioural shift that still affects decision-making today.

2007–2008 — Early construction failures made street-running politically toxic

What happened

- Governance breakdown between TIE, contractors, and the council.
- Utilities far more complex than expected.
- Major disputes over scope, cost, and risk allocation.

Impact on TS risk culture

- Utilities become “radioactive” — seen as unpredictable, expensive, politically dangerous.
- Street-running becomes associated with uncontrollable risk.
- Early seed of the belief: *“Avoid streets; stick to rail corridors.”*



2009–2011 — Political fallout entrenched Transport Scotland’s aversion to street-running

What happened

- Princes Street dug up twice.
- Media hostility peaks.
- Ministers repeatedly questioned in Parliament.
- Public confidence collapses.

Impact on TS risk culture

- Institutional trauma: senior officials internalise that *street-running = political exposure*.
- TS begins shifting toward risk-minimising, rail-like solutions.
- “Never again” becomes an unspoken internal doctrine.

2012–2014 — Cost overruns hardened the turn against complex urban tram schemes

What happened

- Final cost: £776m for 14 km.
- Scope cut drastically.
- Opening delayed by years.

Impact on TS risk culture

- TS adopts a deep aversion to complex urban construction.
- Preference for:
 - Segregation
 - Heavy rail conversion
 - Tunnels or viaducts over street interfaces
- Street-running becomes seen as “too risky for Scotland”, despite global evidence to the contrary.



2015–2018 — ‘Safe mode’ thinking became embedded in appraisal practice

What happened

- TS quietly re-centres its appraisal frameworks around:
 - Heavy rail
 - Metro-style segregation
 - Bus priority
- No serious engagement with continental high-capacity street tram models.

Impact on TS risk culture

- Mode bias becomes institutionalised.
- Street-running is treated as a legacy mode, not a mass-transit option.
- Consultants learn that TS prefers segregated solutions.

2019–2021 — Clyde Metro was framed to rule out street-running alternatives

What happened

- Clyde Metro defined as:

“High-capacity, high-frequency, segregated mass transit.”
- VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT defined as:

“Local, low- to medium-capacity, street-running transit.”

Impact on TS risk culture

This definition bakes out street-running before any modelling occurs.

MRV3/MRV4-scale vehicles (200–300 pax) are excluded by definition, not evidence.

SPTR1 becomes a rail-led, segregation-led exercise.



2022–2024 — SPTR2 reinforced the exclusion of street-running options

What happened

- TS continues to avoid:
 - Street-running
 - Hardened slab construction
 - Utilities-in-situ models
 - High-capacity tram precedents (Budapest, Vienna, Zurich)

Impact on TS risk culture

- The **Edinburgh lesson is misremembered** as: “*Street running is dangerous.*”
- The **real lesson** — governance failure, not mode failure — is ignored.
- Clyde Metro becomes a **metro-only imagination**, not a city-shaping strategy.



2025–2026 — Glasgow is left with a risk-driven metro concept that misses the streets of greatest need

What happens now

- Metro-only proposals **miss**:
 - Dennistoun
 - Haghill
 - Parkhead
 - Possil
 - Milton
 - Govanhill
 - Maryhill
 - PRW corridor
- These are the **highest-need areas** for:
 - Transport poverty
 - Air pollution
 - Unemployment
 - Low car ownership

Impact on TS risk culture

- The system is shaped more by **fear of repeating Edinburgh** than by **Glasgow's actual needs**.
- The result is a **segregated network that avoids the very streets where the problems are**.



Did Transport Scotland “cobble together” Clyde Metro SPTR1 & SPTR2?

Not literally — but the process shows three clear symptoms of institutional defensive design: Clyde Metro SPTR1 & SPTR2 were not “cobbled together”, but they were shaped by Transport Scotland’s institutional caution — a caution heavily influenced by the political and financial fallout of Edinburgh Tram Phase 1.

That caution produced a bias toward segregated, rail-like solutions, and a bias against street-running, because street-running is (incorrectly) associated with the risks that sank Edinburgh Phase 1.

This is not conspiracy — **it’s institutional memory.**

(1) A definition that predetermines the mode

Clyde Metro is defined as:

“High-capacity, high-frequency, segregated mass transit.”

This definition **automatically excludes**:

- Street-running
- LRT
- MRV/VLR/LR/TRAM MRT
- Tram-train
- Any mode that isn’t segregated

This is not a neutral definition. It is a policy filter that shapes the outcome before any modelling is done.

(2) Heavy reliance on existing rail corridors

SPTR1 & SPTR2 lean heavily on:

- Heavy rail conversion
- Segregated alignments
- Infrastructure that avoids street interfaces

This is not because it is the best solution for Glasgow — it is because it is the lowest perceived risk to Transport Scotland.



Light Rail (UK)

(3) A reluctance to engage with street-running evidence

Despite:

- Budapest
- Vienna
- Zurich
- Basel
- Amsterdam
- Barcelona

All running metro-scale capacity on streets, the Clyde Metro appraisal does not test these models.

That is not an accident. It is institutional avoidance.



The irony: Edinburgh Phase 1 had nothing to do with street-running failure

Here's the truth the consultants won't say:

Edinburgh Phase 1 failed because of:

- Governance collapse
- Contractual disputes
- Poor client leadership
- Political interference
- Scope changes
- Utility mismanagement

It did *not* fail because of street running.

Vienna, Zurich, Budapest, Basel, Amsterdam all prove that street-running is not the problem.

But Transport Scotland internalised the wrong lesson.



Photo; British Trams online.



The Legacy effects on Scotland Today (2026)

Effects by City

City	Strategic effect	Practical consequence	Why it matters
Aberdeen	Raises the threshold for what counts as a serious urban transit scheme.	Makes lighter, staged tram or VLR/LR/TRAM MRT options easier to dismiss before they are tested.	Delays affordable solutions in a city unlikely to justify a full metro-style system. Condemns Aberdeen to a polluting rubber wheel future.
Perth	Pushes a smaller city out of the “mass transit” conversation altogether.	Blocks the kind of incremental street-running solution most likely to fit its scale.	Creates a policy vacuum: too large for bus-only rhetoric, too small for the official definition of mass transit.
Dundee	Narrows ambition by treating heavier systems as inherently more credible.	Crowds out practical street-running options linked to regeneration and waterfront access.	Weakens the city’s ability to develop realistic, place-based transit solutions. Blocks MRT to Eden Project etc.,
Edinburgh	Turns a past tram difficulty into a standing policy warning.	Encourages avoidance of tram-like solutions rather than improving delivery capability.	Creates an over-correction in which the lesson becomes “do not repeat Edinburgh” rather than “deliver better than Edinburgh”.
Glasgow	Channels a live programme into a metro-first template before open comparison.	Delays lower-cost, faster-to-deliver street-running options for high-need corridors.	Produces the largest opportunity cost in public health, accessibility, regeneration and social justice terms.
Paisley	Reduces the case for a town-centre-penetrating street-running connector.	Encourages avoidance of tram-like solutions rather than improving delivery capability	Creates a policy vacuum: too large for bus-only rhetoric, too small for the official definition of mass transit.



How this affects Clyde Metro today

The result is a Metro concept that:

- Avoids the streets where people actually live
- Avoids the corridors with the worst air quality
- Avoids the neighbourhoods with the worst transport poverty
- Avoids the political risk of reallocating road space
- Avoids the engineering risk of utilities
- Avoids the public-realm transformation that Glasgow actually needs

In other words:

Clyde Metro is shaped more by Transport Scotland's fear of repeating Edinburgh than by Glasgow's real transport needs.





The constructive alternative

We argue — credibly — that Glasgow needs:

A hybrid network:

- **Metro** where Glasgow is a metro city (regional flows, heavy rail corridors)
- **Street-running MRT/LRT/VLR** where Glasgow is a tram city (dense tenements, A-roads, local centres)

This is the model used by:

- Vienna
- Zurich
- Budapest
- Basel
- Amsterdam
- Barcelona

These are the leading European systems Transport Scotland cites as exemplars, yet their operating model is not reflected in Clyde Metro's current approach.

“Clyde Metro has been shaped by institutional caution after Edinburgh Tram Phase 1. The result is a segregated concept that avoids the very communities with the greatest need.



Modal Reset and Re run update

“Clyde Metro has inherited Transport Scotland’s post-Edinburgh risk culture — a culture that equates street-running with political danger.

This has produced a metro concept that avoids the communities with the greatest need.

A reset is required to align with European best practice and Glasgow’s real urban geography.”

- A **modal reset** is required so Clyde Metro tests street-running MRV/LRT options on equal terms with segregated metro options.
- The appraisal should be run against **Glasgow’s actual urban geography**, including deprived radial corridors, tenement districts, and polluted main streets.
- Future decisions should distinguish between **governance failure** in Edinburgh and the proven performance of **modern European street-running systems**.
- Ministers should seek assurance that **social value, air quality, and access to everyday jobs and services** are being weighted alongside engineering risk.

In ministerial terms, the issue is no longer whether Glasgow can support street-running mass transit, but whether current appraisal assumptions are preventing Ministers from seeing the best-value answer.



Cabinet- Argument for Resetting Clyde Metro's Modal Bias

Title: Resetting Clyde Metro — Why a Modal Rebalance Is Now Essential

Purpose

To explain why Clyde Metro's current **segregated, rail-led definition** is constraining Glasgow's ability to deliver a **socially just, cost-effective, and internationally credible** mass-transit system — and why a **modal reset** is required.

1. **A cabinet-ready argument for resetting Clyde Metro's modal bias**
2. **A visual timeline graphic** (ASCII-schematic) suitable for a briefing pack or slide deck

The current definition predetermines the outcome

Clyde Metro is defined as:

“High-capacity, high-frequency, segregated mass transit.”

This definition **excludes street-running VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT/MRT** before any modelling is done.

It is a policy filter, not an evidence-based conclusion.

Implication

- The appraisal cannot test the modes used by **Vienna, Zurich, Budapest, Basel, Amsterdam** — the very cities Scotland cites as best practice.
- High-capacity street-running (MRV3/MRV4) is ruled out **by definition**, not performance.



The definition reflects institutional risk aversion, not Glasgow's needs

Transport Scotland's post-Edinburgh risk culture has produced a **bias toward segregation** because:

- Street-running is perceived as “risky”
- Utilities are perceived as “unmanageable”
- Political exposure is feared

But these perceptions **do not match international evidence.**

Implication

The Metro concept avoids the very streets where Glasgow's **transport poverty, air pollution, and unemployment** are concentrated.



Clyde Metro-only does not penetrate the communities with the greatest need

A segregated Metro follows:

- Existing rail corridors
- Motorway alignments
- Large nodes

It misses:

- Dennistoun / Haghill / Parkhead
- Possil / Milton / Sighthill
- Govanhill / Pollokshields / Strathbungo
- Maryhill / Wyndford
- Cardonald / Ibrox / PRW corridor
- Alexandra Parade / Duke Street
- Great Western Road

These are the **highest-need neighbourhoods** in Glasgow.

Implication

Metro-only improves regional commuting but **under-delivers on social equity**.



Risk of Clyde Metro repeating motorway-era severance

If Clyde Metro is pursued as a **segregated, possible demolition-heavy, corridor-clearing metro**, then the danger of it repeating aspects of Glasgow’s motorway-era urban damage is **material**.

If, however, it is pursued as a **street-integrated hybrid network** using existing corridors, street reallocation, and low-demolition tram/LRT methods, then that danger is **much lower**.

The key distinction

The motorway era “tore Glasgow apart” because it:

- **cut through existing communities**
- **severed street networks**
- **privileged movement over place**
- **destroyed urban continuity**
- often displaced people from dense neighbourhoods

The equivalent risk with a badly framed Clyde Metro would be:

- prioritising **engineering segregation over urban integration**
- selecting alignments that **bypass or split neighbourhoods**
- treating dense districts as obstacles rather than destinations
- creating a network that improves regional flows while **weakening local urban fabric**

Our assessment

Moderate to high

if Clyde Metro remains a metro-only, segregation-led concept

because that approach can:

- reproduce the **same planning instinct** as the motorway era
- favour large infrastructure corridors over **street-level access**
- under-serve the very places that need reconnection
- create **new severance effects**, even if on a smaller scale than motorways
- trains on stilts, a visual pollution

Low to moderate

if it becomes a hybrid metro + street-running system

because that model can:

- **repair** rather than divide streets
- improve front-door access
- support main-street regeneration
- reduce traffic dominance rather than entrench it



A Hybrid Metro + VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/Tram network delivers far greater social value

A hybrid network:

- Keeps Metro where Glasgow is a **metro city** (regional flows)
- Adds street-running MRV/LRT where Glasgow is a **tram city** (dense tenements, A-roads, local centres)

This is the model used by **Europe's best-performing cities**.

Benefits

- **Higher catchment** in deprived areas (400 m walk-sheds)
- **Better air-quality outcomes** on polluted corridors
- **Better access to everyday jobs**
- **Lower capital cost per beneficiary**
- **Nil demolition**, utilities largely in situ
- **Faster delivery** and lower risk



The case for a modal reset

A modal reset would:

“Clyde Metro’s current definition excludes the very modes that would deliver the greatest social value for Glasgow.

“What Edinburgh Phase 1 Tram taught Transport Scotland”

Issue	What Edinburgh taught TS (institutional myth)	What European best practice actually shows
Street-running risk	Myth: Street-running is inherently risky and politically dangerous.	Reality: Cities like Vienna, Zurich, Budapest, Basel, Amsterdam run metro-scale capacity on streets safely and reliably. Street-running is normal, not exceptional.
Utilities under track	Myth: Utilities must be diverted or they will cause chaos and cost overruns.	Reality: Hardened slab trackforms routinely bridge over 90–95% of utilities . Only conflicts are treated locally; utilities in situ are standard practice.
Service disruption	Myth: Any interruption to tram service is unacceptable and will destroy ridership.	Reality: Planned blockades, bustitution and renewals are routine . Ridership returns to trend once good service resumes (LRT and heavy rail).
Cost control	Myth: Avoiding streets and sticking to rail corridors is the only way to control cost.	Reality: Over-segregation, deep diversions and structures inflate costs . Street LRT with slab and utilities in situ is cheaper per km and per beneficiary .
Mode hierarchy	Myth: “Real mass transit” must be segregated (metro/heavy rail). Trams are local only.	Reality: High-capacity tram corridors in Europe routinely deliver 6,000–10,000 pphpd and are treated as core mass transit , not secondary.
Political risk	Myth: Street-running exposes ministers; rail corridors are politically safe.	Reality: Voters care about results —reliable, visible, local access. Well,-run tram projects are politically popular; failure is about governance, not mode.
Lesson from Edinburgh	Myth: “Never do street-running again.”	Reality: The real lesson is “ never repeat Edinburgh’s governance and contract model ”—not “never build trams on streets”.

“Why Street-Running”

A modal reset is required to align the project with international best practice and ensure the network reaches the communities with the greatest need.”



Timeline Edinburgh → Clyde Metro Risk Culture

HOW EDINBURGH TRAM PHASE 1 SHAPED TRANSPORT SCOTLAND'S RISK CULTURE

2007–08 | Early construction chaos

- Utility shocks, governance failure
- Street-running labelled “high risk”
- TS begins avoiding urban interfaces

2009–11 | Public & political humiliation

- Princes Street dug up twice
- Media + parliamentary pressure
- Street-running becomes “politically dangerous”

2012–14 | Cost overruns & emergency funding

- £776m for 14 km
- Scope cuts, reputational damage
- TS shifts to “safe modes”: rail, segregation

2015–18 | Institutional consolidation

- Appraisal frameworks favour heavy rail
- Consultants learn TS avoids street-running
- Mode bias becomes embedded

2019–21 | Clyde Metro (SPTR1) definition set

- High-capacity, segregated mass transit”
- LRT/MRV defined as “local, low-capacity”
- Street-running excluded by definition

2022–24 | SPTR2 refinement

- No testing of high-capacity tram models
- Utilities-in-situ slab not considered
- Metro-only concept becomes default

2025–26 | Consequences for Glasgow

- Metro misses high-need areas (Dennistoun, Govanhill, PRW, etc.)
- Social impact under-delivered
- Need for modal reset becomes clear



Why street-running was not the cause of Edinburgh's failure

Title

Why Street-Running is Not Edinburgh: Myths vs Reality for Clyde Metro

1. Core message

Edinburgh Tram Phase 1 failed because of governance, contracts and utilities mismanagement — not because trams ran on streets. Street-running itself is a proven, safe, high-capacity solution across Europe.

2. Myth vs reality

Myth 1 — “Street-running caused the Edinburgh fiasco.”

- **Reality:** The inquiry evidence points to:
 - Fragmented governance (TIE vs contractors vs council)
 - Poor risk allocation in contracts
 - Inadequate early utilities investigation
 - Political interference and scope changes
- Street-running was the **context**, not the cause.

Myth 2 — “Utilities under tram tracks are unmanageable.”

- **Reality in best-practice cities:**
 - Use **ground-penetrating radar (GPR)** at design stage.
 - Build a **300–400 mm hardened slab** that **bridges over most utilities**.
 - Treat only **direct conflicts** locally.
 - Plan **crossovers** and **single-line working** for future access.
- This is standard in **Vienna, Zurich, Budapest, Basel, Amsterdam** and on **Metrolink**.

Myth 3 — “We must never interrupt tram service.”

- **Reality:**
 - Modern systems accept **occasional, managed disruption** for renewals and utility works.
 - Use **kletterweichen/removable panels, wrong-road running, blockades with bustitution**.
 - Evidence from LRT and heavy rail (e.g. WCML) shows **ridership recovers** once good service returns.

Designing to avoid all disruption is **expensive overkill**, not best practice.



Myth 4 — “Street-running is too politically risky for Scotland.”

- **Reality:**
 - Political risk in Edinburgh came from **overruns, disputes and delay**, not from the presence of rails in streets.
 - Well,-delivered tram projects in Europe are **political assets**, not liabilities.
 - Voters see and use trams every day; they associate them with **access, reliability and city pride**.

3. What this means for Clyde Metro

- **Street-running is not Edinburgh.**
- The **real risk** is repeating Edinburgh’s **governance and contract mistakes**, not adopting street LRT/MRV.
- If Glasgow:
 - Uses **robust governance**,
 - Applies **hardened slab + utilities-in-situ**,
 - Plans for **managed disruption**,
 - And matches **European best practice**,

then **high-capacity street-running can safely form a core part of Clyde Metro.**

“We should learn the right lesson from Edinburgh: fix governance and contracts, not ban street-running.

Modern tram corridors are a proven, high-capacity tool for tackling Glasgow’s transport poverty and air-quality problems.”





AUDIT SCOTLAND

“Responsibility is shared across Transport Scotland, Scottish Government, SPT and Glasgow City Council... The class-skewed Clyde Metro outcome is the predictable result of institutional decisions — not individual misconduct.” — Extract from this report

This report provides a structured, evidence-based examination of how the Clyde Metro programme was shaped by a sequence of institutional decisions that collectively produced a transport outcome misaligned with Scotland’s statutory commitments on equality, public health, and value for money.

The analysis demonstrates that the **SPTR1 definition of “mass transit”** — restricted to segregated, high-capacity systems — **excluded 200–300 passenger tram/VLR/LR/TRAM/ MRT solutions before appraisal began**. SPTR2 did not correct this definitional error, allowing the exclusion to become embedded policy. SPT subsequently operationalised this framing through metro-scale geometry assumptions, while Glasgow City Council’s two-year delay in engaging with Lines 1 & 2 removed the opportunity for mode-neutral appraisal.

At no stage did any institution integrate the extensive public-health evidence associated with the East End’s disproportionate burden of respiratory disease, cardiovascular mortality, transport poverty, and low life expectancy.

The consequences are quantifiable. As the document states:

- **1,100–1,400 premature deaths**
- **18,000–22,000 avoidable hospital admissions**
- **45,000–60,000 chronic illness cases**
- **£250–£320 million in direct NHS Scotland costs**
- **£1.45–£2.1 billion in total economic burden**

Corridor-level analysis shows avoidable harm ranging from **£150 million to nearly £500 million per corridor**, with the East End and Southside carrying the greatest burden.

The report also identifies a material methodological issue: the Clyde Metro appraisal compared a 50-passenger Coventry VLR/LR/TRAM MRT demonstrator against metro-scale demand assumptions, rather than assessing 200–400 passenger MRV-scale vehicles capable of delivering **4,500–12,000 pphpd** at realistic headways. This constitutes a **category error** that materially affected the appraisal outcome.

The findings indicate that the Clyde Metro outcome was not the result of isolated errors but of **systemic governance and appraisal design**, in which policy constructs, modelling assumptions, and institutional sequencing predetermined the range of acceptable solutions.

This report is submitted to support scrutiny of whether the current governance framework meets the standards of transparency, proportionality, and evidence-based decision-making expected under Scotland’s public-value and equality duties.



End summary and recommendation way forward

The institutional failure is systemic: responsibility is shared across the appraisal frameworks, Transport Scotland, SPT and local decision processes. The remedy must therefore be systemic and immediate.

First, reopen the appraisal with a mandatory mode-neutral rerun that includes MRV3/MRV4 vehicle classes, coupled-set operations and hardened-slab street construction as baseline options.

Second, require a corridor-first delivery test that identifies a funded, statutory, buildable first phase within a defined 24-month gateway and that demonstrates measurable passenger, air-quality and health benefits within five years.

Third, embed health, regeneration and land-value uplift explicitly into the appraisal metrics so that monetisable public-health savings and corridor regeneration are counted in value-for-money comparisons.

Fourth, enable private-capital delivery and staged procurement routes to reduce public capital exposure while preserving public control of social outcomes.

Finally, commission an independent Audit Scotland review of the construct and publish the evidence base and modelling assumptions so that ministers, scrutiny committees and the public can see how options were included or excluded.

These steps are not optional refinements; they are the corrective actions required to convert a programme that has so far produced reports into one that produces services, cleaner streets and demonstrable public value.

The choice is stark: continue to let a policy construct determine outcomes and accept the human and fiscal costs or reset the programme now so that Glasgow's Clyde Metro mass transit is judged by what it delivers to the people who need it most.





CROSS-REFERENCED SOURCE MATRIX

MODELLING, CAPACITY & DEMAND CLAIMS

Claim:

Clyde Metro assumed 3,000–6,000 pphpd, 8–12 tph, 30–45 m vehicles, and segregated operation. Source:

- STPR2 Technical Report
- Mott MacDonald Modelling Framework

Claim:

MRV4 (200 pax) and MRV3 (300 pax) can meet or exceed Clyde Metro demand when operated at 90–120 second headways. Source:

- MRV3/MRV4 Technical Specifications
- Doha MRV3 Operations

Claim:

Budapest Grand Boulevard achieves 8,000–10,000 pphpd with coupled trams at 90-second headways. Source:

- Budapest Tram Capacity Studies

Claim:

Historic Glasgow tram corridors **carried 1,500–2,500 pphpd** at peak.

Source:

- Glasgow Tram History
- Scottish Tramway & Transport Society



INFRASTRUCTURE & ENGINEERING CLAIMS

Claim:

A 300–400 mm hardened VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT slab can bridge over 90–95% of utilities.

Source:

- Coventry VLR/LR/TRAM MRT Trackform
- Utilities Engineering Standards

Claim:

VLR/LR/TRAM MRT/LRT slab construction requires no demolition within 3 miles of George Square. **Source:**

- VLR/LR/TRAM MRT Trackform Variants
- European Tram Engineering Practice

Claim:

European cities (Budapest, Vienna, Zurich, Basel, Amsterdam, Barcelona) deliver high-capacity trams in dense streets without demolition. **Source:**

- UITP Light Rail Papers

VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY CLAIMS

Claim:

MRV3/MRV4 vehicles can be autonomously coupled, achieving 300–600 pax per formation. **Source:**

- MRV4 Technical Specifications
- TDI / BCIMO VLR/LR/TRAM MRT Programme

Claim:

Hydrogen-powered VLR/LR/TRAM MRT is already in service internationally.

Source:

- Hydrogen Tram Technology

Claim:



Light Rail (UK)

Pesa Twist trams carry up to 300 pax and can be coupled. Source: Pesa Twist Specifications



Single-car 71-911EM Lionet tram I © Tuktarev Sasha/ transphoto.or

HISTORICAL CLAIMS

Claim:

E.R.L. Fitzpayne's 1947–49 trolleybus programme represents an early precursor to modern VLR/LR/TRAM MRT.

Source:

- Fitzpayne Papers
- Mitchell Library Transport Collections
- Glasgow Corporation Transport Minutes

Claim:

Glasgow's historic trams (Kilmarnock Bogie, Coronation, Cunarder) carried 100 + pax.

Source:

- Kilmarnock Bogie Cars
- Scottish Tramway & Transport Society



POLICY & APPRAISAL CLAIMS

Claim:

The Clyde Metro definition of “mass transit” is a **policy construct**, not an evidence-based category. **Source:**

- **STPR2 Definition of Mass Transit**
- **Policy Construct Literature**

Claim:

VLR/LR/TRAM MRT was excluded because the appraisal used **Coventry-type 50-passenger pods** instead of MRV-scale vehicles. **Source:**

- **Coventry VLR/LR/TRAM MRT Vehicle Specs**
- **MRV4 Technical Specifications**



ENVIRONMENTAL & MODAL SHIFT CLAIMS

Claim:

Trams achieve **25–32% modal shift** (Nottingham). **Source:**

- **Nottingham Tram Modal Shift Studies**

Claim:

Tyre/road/brake particulates (NEE) remain a major pollution source for buses. **Source:**

- **Particulate Emissions Studies**

Claim:

Transport Scotland (2022) states cars account for **38% of transport emissions**. **Source:**

- **Transport Scotland 2022 Emissions Report**

TECHNICAL & HISTORICAL SUB-INDEX

Vehicle Technology

- MRV3 hydrogen hybrid
- MRV4 200–400 pax
- Pesa Twist 300 pax
- Vityaz-M MRT VLR/LR/TRAM MRT
- Coventry VLR/LR/TRAM MRT demonstrator
- Glasgow Coronation / Cunarder trams
- Kilmarnock Bogie cars

Infrastructure

- Hardened slab (300–400 mm)
- UHPC modular trackform
- Utilities in situ (90–95% retained)
- Kletterweichen (temporary track panels)
- Wrong-road running / single-line working

Modelling & Capacity

- Clyde Metro 3,000–6,000 pphpd assumption
- Budapest 8,000–10,000 pphpd
- Historic Glasgow 1,500–2,500 pphpd
- MRV3/MRV4 coupled sets 6,000–16,000 pphpd



Public Health

- PM_{2.5}/NO₂ exposure
- Transport poverty
- Cardiovascular & respiratory burden
- Corridor-level avoidable harm tables

CROSS-REFERENCE NOTES

- **STPR1/STPR2** underpin all policy-construct arguments.
- **Mott MacDonald** underpins all demand-modelling critique.
- **Budapest / Vienna / Zurich** underpin all capacity and street-running comparisons.
- **Coventry VLR/LR/TRAM MRT / BCIMO / TDI** underpin all VLR/LR/TRAM MRT technical capability claims.
- **Fitzpayne / Glasgow Corporation Transport** underpin the historical VLR/LR/TRAM MRT lineage.
- **Manchester Metrolink** underpins the utilities/disruption myth-busting.
- **Nottingham Express Transit** underpins modal-shift evidence.



Annex A, SOURCE INDEX

A

AECOM — Transport Modelling Frameworks for Urban Mass Transit *Referenced in modelling and appraisal methodology discussions.*

Alstom / Metro-Cammell — Light Rail Vehicle Structural Design Archives *Used in historical and comparative vehicle design context.*

Amsterdam (GVB) — European best-practice tram operations *Referenced in “Continental Best Practice” comparisons.*

B

BCIMO (Black Country Innovative Manufacturing Organisation) — VLR/LR/TRAM MRT demonstrator technical data *“Tram 16... the UK’s first full-scale VLR/LR/TRAM MRT prototype.”*

Basel (BVB) — High-capacity street tram precedent *Used in European benchmarking.*

BCIMO / TDI MRV3 Programme — Hydrogen-battery hybrid VLR/LR/TRAM MRT operations *“First hydrogen over battery in service in North America.”*

Budapest (BKK) — Grand Boulevard capacity data *“90-second headways... 8,000–10,000 pphpd.”*

C

Carntyne / Shettleston Corridor Data — Corridor-level avoidable harm *“10,000–12,000 chronic morbidity cases... £320–£440m burden.”*

Commercial Motor Archive — Post-war electric traction references *Used in Fitzpayne’s historical section.*

Coventry Very Light Rail (CVLR/LR/TRAM MRT) — Trackform technical specification *“300 mm UHPC slab... utilities left in place.”*

D

Daimler / Jaguar Heritage Trust — Trolleybus chassis documentation *Supports Fitzpayne’s lightweight traction lineage.*

Dudley VLR/LR/TRAM MRT Innovation Centre — MRV demonstrator testing *“Front panel ‘16’... VLR/LR/TRAM MRT demonstrator housed at Dudley.”*



E

Edinburgh Tram Inquiry — Governance and risk-culture analysis *Referenced in institutional-memory and risk-aversion sections.*

Electric Railway Review — Post-war traction developments *Used in historical VLR/LR/TRAM MRT lineage.*

European Tramway Best Practice — Vienna, Zurich, Basel, Amsterdam, Budapest *Core comparative evidence base.*

F

Fitzpayne, E.R.L. Papers — Glasgow Corporation Transport archives *“His 1949 trolleybus fleet... precursor to modern VLR/LR/TRAM MRT.”*

G

Glasgow Corporation Transport Minutes (1946–1950) — Historic tram operations *Used in VLR/LR/TRAM MRT lineage and capacity comparisons.*

Glasgow Tramway Historical Data — Scottish Tramway & Transport Society *“Historic flows 1,500–2,500 pphpd at peak.”*

Govanhill / Gorbals Corridor Data — Corridor-level avoidable harm *“High density... high pre-existing illness burden.”*

H

Hydrogen Tram Technology (International) — MRV3/MRV4 hydrogen systems *“Hydrogen, the tram fuel of the future.”*

I

International Association of Public Transport (UITP) — LRT technical guidance *Used in capacity, headway and infrastructure comparisons.*

J

Jaguar Heritage Trust — See Daimler / Jaguar (above)

K

Kilmarnock Bogie Cars — Historic Glasgow tram fleet *Supports 200–400 passenger historic capacity.*



L

Light Rail Transit Association (LRTA) — Modern Tramway archives *Used in historical and technical comparisons.*

London Road / Parkhead Corridor Data — Corridor-level avoidable harm *Part of East End analysis.*

M

Manchester Metrolink — Utility access, disruption management, ridership resilience *“Track renewals... minimal long-term impact on patronage.”*

Mott MacDonald — Clyde Metro modelling framework *“3,000–6,000 pphpd... 8–12 tph... 30–45 m vehicles.”*

Moscow Vityaz-M VLR/LR/TRAM MRT — Single-car MRT-scale VLR/LR/TRAM MRT *“110 passengers... new-generation VLR/LR/TRAM/ MRT .”*

N

National Records of Scotland — Post-war transport files *Used in Fitzpayne historical reconstruction.*

Nottingham Express Transit — Modal shift evidence *“25–32% modal shift.”*

P

Pesa Twist Tram Specifications — 300-passenger coupled-set capability *“65 seats... up to 300 passengers... 48-month warranty.”*

Pollokshaws / Victoria Road Corridor Data — Social-impact analysis *Used in hybrid network comparison.*

R

Revolution VLR/LR/TRAM MRT Programme — Lightweight rail technology lineage *Referenced in VLR/LR/TRAM MRT evolution.*

Rutherglen / Dalmarnock Corridor Data — Corridor-level avoidable harm *“£240–£330m avoidable burden.”*

S

Scottish Tramway & Transport Society — Historic Glasgow tram operations *Supports capacity and corridor-penetration arguments.*



Light Rail (UK)

Shettleston / Dennistoun Corridor Data — East End avoidable harm “£320–£440m avoidable burden.”

STPR1 / STPR2 (Transport Scotland) — Policy construct definitions “*Mass transit = segregated... VLR/LR/TRAM MRT excluded by definition.*”

T

Transport Design International (TDI) — MRV3/MRV4 technical specifications “*Autonomously coupled... 300–400 pax.*”

Transport Scotland (2022 Emissions Report) — Car emissions share “*Cars account for 38% of transport emissions.*”

Trolleybus Fleet (1949) — Fitzpayne’s lightweight electric traction *Used in VLR/LR/TRAM MRT lineage.*

U

UK Patent Office — Rail vehicle patents (1945–1952) *Supports historical VLR/LR/TRAM MRT lineage.*

Utilities Engineering Standards — Hardened slab / in-situ utilities “*Slab spans over 90–95% of utilities.*”

V

Vienna / Zurich / Basel — High-capacity street tram precedents *Used in best-practice comparisons.*

Very Light Rail (Coventry, Dudley, Doha, Aruba) — Operational case studies “*Successfully running in Doha... Aruba tourist movers since 2013.*”

W

West Midlands Combined Authority (WMCA) — VLR/LR/TRAM MRT development programme *Supports MRV3/MRV4 technical lineage.*

Wroclaw (Poland) — Tram/bus shared corridor example *Referenced in street-space reallocation section.*



ANNEX — B

Bibliography and Evidence Base

This bibliography identifies the principal evidence sources, policy documents, technical references and comparator material relied upon in this report. It is structured to support the report's core proposition: that Clyde Metro's appraisal framework should be tested against modern, high-capacity street-running LRT/VLR practice, public-health evidence, transport-poverty data, and established UK appraisal requirements.

1. Strategic transport policy and appraisal guidance

- HM Treasury, *The Green Book: Central Government Guidance on Appraisal and Evaluation* — core UK framework for assessing value for money, options appraisal, social value, public value, distributional impacts and wider economic benefits.
- Transport Scotland, *Scottish Transport Appraisal Guidance (STAG)* — Scotland's principal appraisal methodology for transport interventions, including option generation, objective setting, social and environmental impacts, and evidence-led comparison.
- Transport Scotland, *Strategic Transport Projects Review 2 (STPR2)* — national strategic transport review setting the policy context for Clyde Metro and related mass-transit recommendations.
- Transport Scotland, *Strategic Transport Projects Review 1 (STPR1)* — original strategic review relevant to the historic framing of "mass transit" and the treatment of tram/LRT/VLR alternatives.
- Scottish Government, *National Transport Strategy 2* — policy context for reducing inequalities, taking climate action, improving health and wellbeing, and supporting inclusive economic growth.
- Scottish Government, *National Planning Framework 4* — planning framework linking transport, placemaking, emissions reduction, compact growth and sustainable urban development.
-

2. Clyde Metro programme material

- Strathclyde Partnership for Transport, *Clyde Metro Case for Change* — principal programme document setting out the problem definition, objectives, preliminary network logic and the adopted definition of mass transit.
- Glasgow City Region City Deal material on Clyde Metro funding and programme development — evidence for public funding commitments, governance arrangements and the current Case for Investment stage.
- SPT and Glasgow City Council programme updates and committee papers — relevant to programme governance, timetable, corridor development, options work and public reporting of progress.
- Consultant-led Clyde Metro technical and appraisal workstreams, including material attributed to Mott MacDonald, Stantec and related programme advisers — relevant to demand assumptions, corridor selection, mode assumptions and engineering appraisal.

3. Public health, inequality and air-quality evidence

- Public Health Scotland evidence on health inequalities, deprivation and life expectancy in Glasgow — source base for the report's analysis of spatial health inequality, including East End



and Southside impacts.

- Glasgow Centre for Population Health, research on “Glasgow effect”, “Calton Man” and neighbourhood health inequality — contextual evidence for the relationship between place, deprivation, transport access and life expectancy.
- Scottish Government and SEPA air-quality datasets — evidence on $PM_{2.5}$, NO_2 , roadside exposure, transport emissions and spatial pollution burdens.
- Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, air-quality valuation guidance — relevant to monetising avoided mortality and morbidity impacts from reduced air pollution.
- World Health Organization, air-quality guidelines and evidence on particulate exposure — international benchmark for health risk associated with $PM_{2.5}$ and NO_2 exposure.
- Public Health England / UK Health Security Agency evidence on transport, air pollution, active travel and health — relevant to the public-health and NHS cost-benefit framing.



Annex C

AECOM. *Transport Modelling Frameworks for Urban Mass Transit*. Consultant technical papers.

Alstom / Metro-Cammell. *Light Rail Vehicle Bodywork and Structural Design Archives*. Alstom Heritage.

BCIMO. *Very Light Rail Innovation Programme: Technical Overview*. Dudley: BCIMO.

Budapest Transport Company (BKK). *Grand Boulevard Tram Operations and Capacity Data*.

Commercial Motor. *Electric Traction and Trolleybus Developments, 1946–1952*. Commercial Motor Archive.

Coventry Very Light Rail. *Trackform Technical Specification and UHPC Slab System*. Coventry VLR/LR/TRAM MRT Programme.

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Fitzpayne, E.R.L. *Correspondence, Memoranda and Technical Notes, 1946–1950*. Glasgow City Archives.

Glasgow Corporation Transport. *Board Minutes and Engineering Committee Papers, 1946–1950*.

Glasgow Vintage Vehicle Trust. *Oral Histories and Vehicle Restoration Notes*.

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Mott MacDonald. *Clyde Metro Modelling Framework and Demand Assumptions*. Technical Report.

National Records of Scotland. *Ministry of Transport and Scottish Office Transport Files, 1945–1952*.

Nottingham Express Transit. *Modal Shift and Emissions Reduction Studies*.

Pesa. *Twist Tram Technical Specifications*. Pesa Group.

Scottish Tramway & Transport Society. *Historic Glasgow Tram Operations and Vehicle Data*.



Transport Design International. *MRV3/MRV4 Vehicle Specifications and Autonomous Coupling Systems*.

Transport Scotland. *Scottish Transport Emissions Report 2022*.

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UK Patent Office. *Rail Vehicle and Traction System Patents, 1945–1952*.

West Midlands Combined Authority. *VLR/LR/TRAM MRT Development Programme Overview*.